Sex Selection Abortion: A Constitutional Analysis of the Abortion Liberty and a Person\u27s Right to Know by Schaibley, John R., III
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 56 | Issue 2 Article 4
Winter 1980
Sex Selection Abortion: A Constitutional Analysis
of the Abortion Liberty and a Person's Right to
Know
John R. Schaibley III
Indiana University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Health Law and Policy Commons, Law and Gender
Commons, and the Sexuality and the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Schaibley, John R. III (1980) "Sex Selection Abortion: A Constitutional Analysis of the Abortion Liberty and a Person's Right to
Know," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 56 : Iss. 2 , Article 4.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol56/iss2/4
NOTES
Sex Selection Abortion: A Constitutional
Analysis of the Abortion Liberty and a
Person's Right to Know
Jane Doe is pregnant and wants a baby boy. She goes to her gynecol-
ogist and asks her to perform a medical test which will reveal the fetus'
sex. The test results indicate the fetus is female. Doe has an abortion to
dispose of the unwanted female fetus.
As a result of the accessibility of abortion following the Supreme
Court's decision in Roe v. Wade' and the availability of sophisticated in
utero testing to detect fetal sex, such "sex selection abortions" have oc-
curred in recent years.2 Some doctors predict that sex selection abor-
tions will become increasingly common in the near future.' Although no
jurisdiction has yet prohibited this practice, members of Congress have
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
E.g., Washington Post, Sept. 6, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 1, reprinted in 125 CONG. REC.
E4376 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1979).
' Washington Post, Sept. 6, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 1. One observer thinks it could become
common in 1981 or 1982. See id., at 5, col. 3.; note 19 infra. Some physicians do not foresee
sex selection abortion becoming a widespread practice in the long run because of an-
ticipated development of pre-conception sex selection techniques. See, e.g., L. KARP,
GENETIC ENGINEERING 123 (1976). It is not clear, however, how soon such techniques will
become widely available. Even when such pre-conception methods are developed, sex selec-
tion abortions would continue to be wanted in three situations. First, in those cases where
the pre-conception technique had failed, abortion would be used as a backup method of sex
selection. Second, abortion would still be used in a case of an unplanned pregnancy, where a
woman decides after becoming pregnant she wants to bear the child only if it is the "right"
sex. Third, some women might prefer taking a 50-50 chance of the fetus being the "right"
sex and then rely on sex selection abortion rather than use the artificial insemination re-
quired by the most promising pre-conception techniques for sex selection. The clinical pro-
cedure of artificial insemination is unpleasant and it often must be repeated numerous
times in order to attain fertilization. See G. WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE
CRIMINAL LAw 115 (1957). See generally Largey, Reproductive Technologies: Sex Selection,
in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 1439, 1440-41 (1978). Thus, while availability of pre-
conception sex selection may reduce the demand for sex selection abortions, it will not
eliminate the practice. In fact, one could argue that the widespread use of pre-conception
techniques would increase the demand for sex selection abortions by increasing public
awareness and acceptance of sex selection generally. See notes 19 & 158 infra. Also, the
number of sex selection abortions is likely to increase "considerably" when first trimester
fetal sex determination becomes technically feasible. Powledge & Fletcher, Guidelines for
the Ethical Social and Legal Issues in Prenatal Diagnosis, 330 NEw ENG. J. MED. 168, 172
(1979).
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condemned it4 and a legislative prohibition is possible.' Such a prohibi-
tion would be subject to attack on two major constitutional grounds:
first, as an interference with the abortion liberty enunciated in Roe and
its progeny; and second, as an abridgment of the first amendment
freedom of speech interest in the free flow of information.'
Roe held that a woman has a fundamental constitutional right to an
abortion which is free, for the most part, from state interference.!
Although it is clear under Roe that a woman need not state her reasons
for a first or second trimester abortion,8 it is by no means clear that a
woman has a constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy for what-
ever reason she alone chooses. The contours of a woman's "freedom of
choice" regarding the abortion decision have not been fully developed
by the Court thus far and the practice of sex selection abortion raises
issues which it has not yet confronted in its analysis of the. abortion
125 CONG. REC. E4376 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1979) (remarks of Rep. Mazzoli). Represen-
tative Romano Mazzoli called the practice a "grotesque frivolity," borrowing that phrase
from a Washington Star editorial on the subject. Id. Senator Jesse Helms condemned the
practice of sex selection abortion with equally strong language, calling it "an appalling bar-
barity." Id. at S13254 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1979).
' The vociferous debates over federal funding of abortion in each session of Congress
demonstrates a continuing legislative opposition to abortion. See, e.g., id. at S9854-70 (daily
ed. July 19, 1979). Moreover, numerous states have enacted abortion laws which attempt to
restrict abortion to the maximum degree permitted by Roe and its progeny, see, e.g., ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-21 (Supp. 1980), while some states have gone even further and had
their abortion statutes struck down. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6605(a) (Purdon
1977), held unconstitutional in Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979). Thus, some
legislatures desire to restrict access to abortions to the maximum extent permitted by the
courts. This legislative attitude appears to enjoy public support. A recent Gallup Poll on
the issue reveals that 53% of the population think abortion should be "legal only under cer-
tain circumstances," 18% believe it should be "illegal under all circumstances" and 25%
maintain it should be "legal under all circumstances." Washington Post, Aug. 17, 1980, § A,
at 16, col. 1. Given the condemnation of sex selection abortion, see note 18 infra, and these
legislative and public attitudes, prohibition of sex selection abortion is possible if the con-
stitutionality of the prohibition is at least arguable.
' The prohibition could also be attacked more generally as an infringement of the "right
of privacy" enunciated in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). However, as the Court in Roe explicitly states, the privacy in-
terest of a pregnant woman respecting abortion is "inherently different" from the privacy
interests recognized in those cases. 410 U.S. at 159. Thus, the constitutionality of a prohibi-
tion of sex selection abortion must be analyzed in terms of the abortion liberty itself, rather
than the general right to privacy the Court discovered in "emanations from penumbras."
Nonetheless, it should be noted that just as the Court in Roe concluded without any ex-
planation that the right to privacy was "broad enough" to cover abortion generally, see id.
at 153, it similarly could state by fiat that this privacy right is broad enough to cover a
woman's decision to select the sex of her children.
The right of privacy was not really involved in Roe at all; rather, the Court merely used
the phrase "right of privacy" to obfuscate the substantive due process foundation of the
opinion. See id. at 172-73 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); note 45 infra. Such a substantive due
process approach, by its very subjective nature, naturally is beyond legal analysis.
' 410 U.S. at 153-58.
8 See J. NOONAN, A PRIVATE CHOICE 10 (1979).
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liberty. Moreover, recent Supreme Court decisions have substantially
modified the nature of the abortion liberty announced in Roe and pro-
vide that the state may regulate abortions so long as the regulations are
not "unduly burdensome" to a woman's right to seek an abortion.' The
practice of sex selection abortion presents a paradigm case for deter-
mining whether the Court is willing to permit government to impose
any significant limitations on a woman's freedom of choice respecting
the abortion decision.
Whether or not a state prohibition of sex selection abortion is uncon-
stitutional as an infringment on the abortion liberty, such a prohibition
also can be challenged on first amendment freedom of speech grounds.
The only effective way of preventing a woman from having a sex selec-
tion abortion is to keep her ignorant of her fetus' sex by prohibiting the
performance of medical tests to reveal fetal sex.10 A series of Supreme
Court cases indicate that an individual has a first amendment interest in
the "free flow of information" which could render such a prohibition con-
stitutionally infirm.' However, the nature of this first amendment in-
terest is circumscribed by the "legitimacy" of the information sought.
Moreover, an individual's interest in the free flow of information must
be balanced against the state interests in restricting the dissemination
of the information. Thus, whether a woman has a constitutional right to
discover the sex of the fetus she is carrying turns on the strength and
legitimacy of the state interest in preventing sex selection abortions.
After a brief discussion of the use of abortion for sex selection and
the possible sociological effects of the practice, this note will examine
whether prohibition of sex selection abortion interferes with a woman's
constitutional right to seek an abortion. The note proposes that a pro-
hibition of sex selection abortion could withstand constitutional
scrutiny, indicating that the judicially created abortion liberty has
judicially cognizable limits not recognized previously. The note then will
analyze whether a prohibition against the use of medical tests to deter-
mine fetal sex for purposes of sex selection abortion interferes with a
woman's right to receive information. Building on the thesis that the
state may restrict the flow of certain information when it can demon-
strate significant justifications for doing so, the note concludes that a
woman does not have a first amendment right to discover the sex of the
fetus she carries.
' Sed Harris v. McRae, 100 S. Ct. 2671 (1980); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 662 (1979);
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
10 See notes 32 & 158 infra.
See Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingsboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow v.
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
19811
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AMNIOCENTESIS AND SELECTIVE ABORTION
A woman's ability to discover her fetus' sex is a condition precedent
to a sex selection abortion. Fetal sex can be revealed through a medical
technique called amniocentesis. This technique involves withdrawing a
sample of amniotic fluid through a needle inserted into the intrauterine
sac in which the fetus is contained. 2 It is performed as an outpatient
procedure in the second trimester of pregnancy'" and an analysis of the
fluid, through which fetal sex is detected, 4 is normally not available un-
" Largey, supra note 3, at 1441. See generally Nelson & Emery, Amniotic Fluid Cells:
Prenatal Sex Prediction and Culture, in 1 BRIT. MED. J. 523 (1970). Cases concerning amnio-
centesis thus far have arisen in the form of malpractice against physicians for "wrongful
life" or "wrongful birth." See, e.g., Gildner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp.
692 (E.D. Pa. 1978). See generally Note, The Abortion Alternative and the Patient's Right
to Know, 1978 WASH. U. L.Q. 167; Note, Father and Mother Know Best: Defining the
Liability of Physicians for Inadequate Genetic Counseling, 87 YALE L.J. 1488 (1978); see
also Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 618 (1979); Comment,
"Wrongful Birth" Should Liability be Imposed Upon a Physician Who Fails to Warn
Parents of the Risks of Defects in Their Unborn Children?, 14 GONZ. L. REV. 891 (1979).
Courts have been willing to award damages to parents who had a defective child which
would have been aborted had the parents been informed of the option of amniocentesis or if
the test itself had not been negligently interpreted. See, e.g., Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421,
404 A.2d 8 (1979); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807 (1978). See generally
Annot., 83 A.L.R. 3d 15 (1968). It may be difficult to envision a court holding that a physi-
cian has a duty to inform pregnant women of the option of sex selection abortion, yet
perhaps several years ago it would have been equally unforseeable that a doctor had a duty
to disclose the option of aborting infants with genetic abnormalities. However, given the
bases of damage awards in tort actions, see W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 6 (4th ed. 1971),
recognition of a "wrongful sex" action is possible. The plaintiffs, however, might find it dif-
ficult to obtain more than nominal damages. Recognition of a "wrongful sex" action could be
challenged on constitutional grounds. Cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (judicial en-
forcement of racially restrictive covenant held violative of equal protection). See also notes
29 & 189 infra.
13 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CHILD HEALTH AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, ANTENATAL DIAGNOSIS: REPORT OF A CONSENSUS
DEVELOPMENT CONFERENCE 1-4 (National Institutes of Health Pub. No. 79-1973, 1979)
[hereinafter cited as ANTENATAL DIAGNOSIS]. Amniocentesis is usually performed be-
tween the sixteenth and eighteenth weeks of pregnancy. Id. Although it can be performed a
few weeks earlier, id. at 1-187, physicians should wait until the sixteenth week to assure
that a sufficient amount of amniotic fluid is present. Fletcher, Prenatal Diagnosis: Ethical
Issues, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 1336, 1343 (1978). The major risk of amniocentesis is
injury to the fetus, but this rarely occurs. Mulinsky, Prenatal Diagnosis: Clinical Aspects,
in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 1332, 1333 (1978). It should be noted that techniques for
detecting fetal sex in the first trimester are now being developed. See note 3 supra. In ad-
dition, a "do-it-yourself' method of sex determination, involving mixing a pregnant woman's
urine with a commercial drain cleaning product, has been discussed in the popular press.
See, e.g., Louisville Times, Dec. 29, 1979, (Scene), at 6, col. 1. This method is suspect, to say
the least.
" "Fetal sex determination is best done by complete karyotyping [a method of analyzing
the cultured amniotic cells]." Milunsky, supra note 13, at 1333. While fluid analysis is ac-
curate in almost all cases, ANTENATAL DIAGNOSIS, supra note 13, at 1-4, 1-5, errors in sex
determination are possible. Milunsky, supra note 13, at 1335. Thus, a woman could have a
child of the "wrong" sex even after amniocentesis due to possible negligence. For a discus-
sion concerning possible judicial recognition of a "wrongful sex action," see note 12 supra.
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til late in the second trimester when the fetus is close to viability.'5
Amniocentesis is usually performed to detect fetal abnormalities" and
most physicians have been reluctant to use it solely for fetal sex deter-
mination.17 Physicians' reactions to requests for sex selection abortion
5 See ANTENATAL DIAGNOSIS, supra note 13, at 1-187. Analysis of the amniotic fluid cur-
rently takes two to four weeks. Id. at 1-77. Thus, sex selection abortion would usually be
performed anywhere from the eighteenth to twenty-second week of pregnancy. While fetal
viability normally occurs at the twenty-fourth week at the earliest, 410 U.S. at 156, a par-
ticular fetus could achieve viability as early as the twentieth week. 51 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
227, 241 (1974). See also J. PRITCHARD & P. MACDONALD, WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 143 (15th ed.
1976); Special Project-A Survey of Abortion Law, 1980 ARiz. ST. L.J. 67, 130-33.
Moreover, a culture is successfully grown from the first fluid sample 98% of the time.
ANTENATAL DIAGNOSIS, supra note 13, at 1-35. Thus, in the remaining 2% of the cases, a sec-
ond amniocentesis would be required. It would be performed at around the twentieth week
and the fluid analysis would not be available until close to the twenty-fourth week when the
fetus is even more likely to be viable. See also Fletcher, supra note 13, at 1343.
" Delgado & Keyes, Parental Preferences and Selective Abortion: A Commentary on
Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton, and the Shape of Things to Come, 1974 WASH. U. L.Q. 203,
210 n.31. Since 1968, the procedure has been used in over 40,000 cases. ANTENATAL
DIAGNOSIS, supra note 13, at 1-4. Amniocentesis and fluid analysis can detect essentially all
chromosomal abnormalities in the fetus, about 75 serious inborn metabolic disorders and
fetal neural tube defects. Id. When a fetus is found to be "defective," in virtually all cases
the only "treatment" available is the destruction of the fetus through abortion. See id. at
1-2, 1-3. "With the available option of abortion, intrauterine diagnosis of hereditary disease
or congenital defect in the fetus provides an acceptable, albeit imperfect, alternative in the
prevention of such conditions for many families." Id. at 1-31. Experts hope, however, that
methods of in utero treatment will be found in the distant future, but until that occurs
"such a 'prevention' option can have substantial effect on reducing the incidence of such
disorders and on the profound impact which the births of children with such conditions may
have on their families." Id. However, the seriousness of the disorders which can be detected
through amniocentesis varies greatly, from those which are readily treatable to those
which condemn their victims to extreme suffering and early death. Id. at 1-190. If the state
may proscribe sex selection amniocentesis, it is also possible the state may have a role in
regulating the use of amniocentesis for minor fetal abnormalities. While an analysis of the
full ramifications of this issue is outside the scope of this note, it can be observed that many
of the justifications for finding a state's prohibition of sex selection abortion constitutional
also are applicable to state regulation of abortion performed for other, perhaps even more
"trivial," reasons. Concern, for example, has been expressed that eugenic abortions may
contribute to the stigmatization of handicapped individuals and may decrease society's
tolerance of such individuals. See id. at 1-132, 1-135, 1-190. See generally ETHICAL ISSUES IN
HUMAN GENETICS (B. Hilton, D. Callahan, M. Harris, P. Condliffe & B. Berkley eds. 1973);
Callahan, Abortion and Medical Ethics, ANNALS, May, 1978, at 116, 122-23; Friedman, Legal
Implications of Amniocentesis, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 92 (1973). The government, by reserving
access to amniocentesis fluid analyses to those cases in which a severe abnormality is in-
dicated, could prevent the abortion of fetuses with only minor defects. The justifications for
such state action-protection of maternal health, interest in the fetus, preventing
stigmatization of a class of citizens and preventing the amniotic fluid analysis laboratories
from becoming overburdened-would be similar to the justifications for regulation of sex
selection abortion. See notes 184-89 & accompanying text infra.
'7 L. KARP, supra note 3, at 123; Fletcher, Ethics and Amniocentesis for Fetal Sex Iden-
tification, 301 NEW ENG. J. MED. 550 (1979); Washington Post, Sept. 6, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 1.
Amniocentesis performed solely for sex preference must be distinguished from those cases
in which fetal sex is diagnosed to predict the likelihood of an x-linked genetic defect. Some
genetic diseases are sex-linked. In such cases, amniocentesis is performed to ascertain the
fetus' sex. While a female may be a carrier of such a disease, she would not be inflicted
1981]
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range from "mild distaste" to "frank revulsion."18 However, evidence in-
dicates that these attitudes toward the procedure may be changing.19
A woman's "private choice" to have a sex selection abortion is not
with it. "If a maternal carrier of an X-linked disorder is found to be carrying a male fetus,
then that fetus has a fifty percent chance of being affected." Milunsky, supra note 13, at
1333-34. A male fetus is then aborted "recognizing that termination of pregnancy with a
male fetus in these cases will yield a normal abortus in fifty percent of such cases." Id. The
possible state prohibition of sex selection abortion analyzed in this note would not prohibit
abortions desired because of x-linked genetic disease.
11 L. KARP, supra note 3, at 123. Four basic reasons have been given for these negative
attitudes toward the practice: first, sex is not a disease and a physician's role is to treat
disease; second, the practice can be viewed as sexist; third, sex preference is a "trivial" or
"frivolous" reason for an abortion and abortion is a serious moral issue; and fourth, am-
niocentesis is a scarce resource and use of it for sex selection would overburden the system.
Fletcher, supra note 17, at 550-51. Most physicians probably discourage the practice
because of their belief that "abortion for sex choice is morally unjustifiable." Id. at 551. See
also ANTENATAL DIAGNOSIS, supra note 13,'at 1-187; Largey, supra note 3, at 1442-43.
However, sex selection "might facilitate familial adjustments." Id. at 1443. Moreover, the
desire of women to have children of each sex is not at all unusual. A woman with three
girls, for example, might want another child only if it is a boy. On the other hand, some
women might want children of a particular sex. Some lesbians, for example, who employ ar-
tificial insemination to become pregnant, might prefer to have girls.
19 Tabitha Powledge, of the Hastings Center and Institute for Science, Ethics and Life
Studies, said that as more private obstetricians learn to do amniocentesis in their offices,
there will be "lots of obstetricians who are willing [to perform sex selection amniocentesis],
for a price." Washington Post, Sept. 6, 1979, § A, at 5, col. 3; see Milunsky, Medico-Legal
Issues in Prenatal Genetic Diagnosis, in GENETICS AND THE LAW 53, 61 (A. Milunsky & G.
Annas eds. 1976). Moreover, a well-known government bioethicist has endorsed a woman's
right to dispose of a fetus of the "wrong" sex. Fletcher, supra note 17, at 551, 553. Dr. Flet-
cher is a bioethicist at the National Institute of Health. Washington Post, Sept. 6, 1976, § A,
at 5, col. 1. Although previously he had opposed the practice of sex selection abortion, he
now argues that the very legality of abortion under Roe ethically obligates a doctor to ac-
cede to his patients' requests for sex selection amniocentesis. See Fletcher, supra note 17,
at 551-53. "[T]he issue does not turn on the validity of opposition to abortion for sex choice.
The issue turns on the validity of the legal rules on abortion defined by the Supreme Court
. .. " Id. at 551. Roe is thus viewed as an ethical imperative encouraging abortions for
whatever reason the woman alone chooses. Although Fletcher asserts he does not view the
Supreme Court decision as an "ethical consideration" itself, he says "the legal guideline on
abortion points beyond itself to [ethical] principles .... Id. He concludes: "Physician who
agree with the social-ethical perspective that informs the legal rules on abortion will finally
want to keep faith with the moral intent of the law." Id. at 553. Fletcher also argues that
"one must be willing to accept the fact that some abortions will be performed for trivial
reasons." Id. at 551. Fletcher's reliance on the moral force of Roe is quite ironic in light of
the repeated statements in Roe that abortion is a medical decision for the physician. See
410 U.S. at 163-65; See also notes 49, 56-67 & accompanying text infra. See generally Mar-
cin & Marcin, The Physician's Decisionmaking Role in Abortion Cases, 35 THE JURIST 66
(1975).
Furthermore, the view of medicine in general, and amniocentesis in particular, as a com-
modity to increase a patient's happiness is gaining greater acceptance in the medical com-
munity. See generally J. PRITCHARD & P. MACDONALD, supra note 15, at 2; see also
ANTENATAL DIAGNOSIS, supra note 13, at 1-194. George Will reports that this view of
medicine is not confined to the abortion area. He argues that various medical practices, in-
cluding sex selection abortion, " 'aim not at the patient's health but rather at satisfying his
... wishes.' They are not acts of medicine but of gratification: for consumers, not patients."
Washington Post, June 25, 1978, § D, at 7, col. 5, reprinted in 125 CONG. REC. S9865 (daily
ed. July 19, 19791.
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without potential public consequences. The quantitative and qualitative
impact sex selection abortion will have on the sex ratio in society is
unknown. Studies do reveal a general preference for male offspring that
is particularly evident in sex selection abortion cases."0 In addition to
the preference for males among all offspring, many parents prefer the
first child to be a boy.21 Widespread use of sex selection abortion could
yield a higher ratio of males in the population,22 and some scientists see
a number of adverse sociological consequences of such a result.' Accord-
ing to some estimates, the number of women willing to use amniocente-
sis to select the sex of their children could increase24 as the service
" E.g., Cutright, Belt & Scangoni, Gender Preferences, Sex Predetermination, and
Family Size in the United States, 21 Soc. BIOLOGY 242 (1974); Washington Post, Jan. 18,
1980, § A, at 3, col. 1 (early ed.). "Many students in the past 30 years have shown that
parents prefer sons ... [and] a 1978 study found no evidence that son preference is declin-
ing." Id. This preference for males is especially evident in sex selection abortion cases: the
vast majority of aborted fetuses are female. "In one series of women who were tested and
told [fetal sex], 46 were told it was a girl and 29 chose to abort. Of 53 shown to be boys, only
one was aborted." C. RICE, BEYOND ABORTION 98 (1979); see 125 CONG. REC. E4376 (daily ed.
Sept. 10, 1979). The preference for male children is not a recent development and infanti-
cide was practiced in primitive and ancient cultures to control the sex ratio. L. GORDON,
WOMAN'S BODY, WOMAN'S RIGHTS 32, 34 (1974). Female babies were routinely killed in
Tahiti, Formosa, India and North Africa at various times. Id. at 34; see C. DARWIN, THE DES-
CENT OF MAN 288-91 (2d ed. 1874). Moreover, one author asserts: "If infanticide is not
suitable in most of today's societies, it is because we have found better methods of birth
control, not because we are morally superior." L. GORDON, supra, at 35; accord, Tooley,
Abortion and Infanticide in THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF ABORTION 52 (M. Cohen, T. Nagel &
T. Scanlon eds. 1974). Tooley, a philosopher, submits that both abortion and infanticide are
"morally acceptable" practices. Id.
2 See Largey, supra note 3, at 1439, 1442.
2 However, some sociologists and demographers think that any imbalance in the sex
ratio would be short-lived. See, e.g., L. KARP, supra note 3, at 158.
1 Among the possible consequences some scientists predict are: first, an increase or
decrease in population growth; second, increased crime and wars; third, increased male
homosexuality; fourth, increased polyandry; and fifth, increased occurrence of first-child per-
sonality traits in males and later-child traits in females. Largey, supra note 3, at 1443;
Washington Post, Jan. 8, 1980, § A, at 3, col. 1 (early ed.). Furthermore, the views of one
social scientist on pre-conception sex selection techniques may also be applicable to sex
selection abortion: "Now, as a statistical majority, women have little or no control over the
development of this technology and are virtually powerless to prevent it from being used
against them. What will happen when women become a dwindling minority?" Id. To say
that abortion is different because the decision to have an abortion rests solely with the
woman ignores reality. Women, perhaps even more than men in contemporary society, are
subject to the pressures of their spouses or others, and certainly it is not uncommon that
women are pressured into having abortions by husbands, putative fathers or parents. See
J. NOONAN, supra note 8, at 48-50; Duffy, The Abortion Decisions-How Will the United
States Supreme Court Define "Necessary"?, 64 WOMEN'S LAW. J. 3, 16 (1978). Such
pressure, in fact, might account for the marked preference for males, and the aborting of
females, in most sex selection abortion cases. See note 20 supra.
2 The number of sex selection abortions currently being performed is unknown. Never-
theless, the director of prenatal diagnosis at Yale University said he believes "lots of
obstetricians all over the country ... are already quietly doing amniocenteses for sex deter-




becomes more widely available', and publicized," especially in light of
the present concern for the "perfect child"2 and the increasingly per-
missive attitude toward elective abortion.28
Aside from the more demonstrable sociological effects of sex selection
abortion, the practice may have an even more profound impact on soci-
ety. The practice can be viewed as the ultimate expression and manifes-
tation of sexism in society, 9 for it determines who will live on the basis
of sex. A society which recognizes an individual's right to abort a fetus
solely because of his or her sex might be hard-pressed to condemn far
less drastic forms of sexist behavior by individuals."
I Although many obstetricians do not now perform second trimester amniocentesis,
they can be trained to do it in several days. See ANTENATAL DIAGNOSIS, supra note 13, at
1-83, 1-155. Moreover, the calls for more widespread use of amniocentesis for detection of
fetal abnormalities, see, e.g., id. at 1-88, might yield more widespread expertise with the
procedure.
26 In addition to recent media attention to genetic engineering, including network televi-
sion programs which discussed sex selection technologies, recent action by the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) might result in advertising of sex selection amniocentesis. The
FTC ruled that the American Medical Association may not prohibit physicians from adver-
tising their services. Washington Post, Oct. 25, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 1. Given the fact that
most women probably have been unaware of the possibility of sex selection abortion in the
past, see L. KARP, supra note 3, at 150, increased publicity could increase the demand for
the procedure.
' "[T]here are indications that couples are more concerned with the 'quality' of their
children; i.e., with fewer children they are more concerned with rearing the 'perfect child'."
ANTENATAL DIAGNOSIS, supra note 13, at 1-146.
2 It is critical to note the pivotal "permissive role" played by the liberalization
of abortion statutes in the late 1960's which facilitated greatly the growth and
utilization of amnicentesis and prenatal diagnosis services as a meaningful
reproductive alternative. Changing cultural attitudes toward family size, "life-
quality," freedom of choice, and informed decision-making in medical matters
also influenced the increased utilization of the technology.
Id. at 1-57. These attitudes show signs of continuing to gain strength. The number of abor-
tions has increased each year since Roe, with the number now well over 1,000,000 per year.
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 58, 67, 68 (1978).
' The "sexist implication" of the practice has been a recurrent concern in the literature
on the subject. See, e.g., Largey, supra note 3, at 1443. Of course, not everyone would view
all distinctions made on the basis of sex as "sexist." Some, perhaps, would distinguish "in-
vidious" discrimination from other forms of discrimination and decide that aborting a fetus
of the "wrong" sex was not invidious. Moreover, there is a notable inclination in this area to
condemn sex selection abortion far more than pre-conception techniques of sex selection.
See, e.g., L. KARP, supra note 3, at 123.
In other selective abortion cases, the effect of-the abortion on children in the family has
been a concern. "[T]he impact on healthy children of knowing that a potential sibling was
destroyed because it was not healthy raises very serious question[s] about the impact of
abortion on children." ANTENATAL DIAGNOSIS, supra note 13, at 1-132. The impact on
children of knowing a potential sibling was destroyed because of his or her sex raises
similar concerns regarding sexism.
1* A myriad of federal and state legislation now prohibits private citizens from discrimi-
nating against others on the basis of sex. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976 & Supp. III
1979). The legitimacy of such restrictions on private behavior would be called into question
if the law recognized the permissibility of aborting a fetus because of his or her sex. The
fact that a fetus is not recognized as a "person" under the Constitution, see note 189 infra,
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STATE PROHIBITION OF SEX SELECTION ABORTION: SEX
SELECTION AND THE ABORTION LIBERTY
In part because of the societal dangers of sex selection abortion,
private individuals and government officials condemn the practice3 and
thus it is a potential candidate for state regulation.2 Three major fac-
tors make it difficult to assess the constitutionality of governmental
regulation of sex selection abortion under Supreme Court cases concern-
ing abortion.
First, the Court has not yet directly confronted the peculiar question
posed by this practice.3 Indeed, "[t]he Supreme Court justices probably
did not imagine in 1973 that their decision on abortion [Roe] was related
to the right of parents to choose the sex of children through am-
niocentesis."34 Legislatures have not yet attempted to prohibit sex selec-
tion abortion, perhaps at least in part because of a belief that Supreme
Court pronouncements on abortion would render such legislative action
futile. 5 However, the statutes invalidated in Roe v. Wade36 and Doe v.
Bolton37 were broad prohibitions which permitted abortion in only a few
circumstances and not statutes which prohibited only a narrow class of
abortions. Since the issues examined by the Court in these cases are
distinguishable from those raised by sex selection, they are not
dispositive of the sex selection abortion issue. 8
Second, the Supreme Court's recognition of an abortion liberty has
been severely criticized as lacking in any doctrinal basis 9 and thus the
is irrelevant to the issue of sexism, for the reason a woman has a sex selection abortion is
that she does not want a particular individual to come into existence solely because of his or
her sex. A fetus is, after all, a human being, if not a "person," with the characteristic of sex.
3' See notes 4 & 18 supra.
State prohibition of sex selection abortion through the regulation of amniocentesis,
see text accompanying note 10 supra, could take one of two basic forms. It could make sex
selection amniocentesis a criminal offense or it could deny funding to laboratories which
perform such testing. Withholding government funding could be very effective because as
of 1979 complete amniocentesis and analysis of the fluid is performed at only 125 medical
centers in the United States. ANTENATAL DIAGNOSIS, supra note 13, at 1-59. Most of these
centers are affiliated with major universities, see id. at 1-153, which receive substantial
federal and state funding. Although the constitutional issues concerning regulation of sex
selection amniocentesis are essentially the same irrespective of which method of regulation
is used, use of the criminal sanction might be more suspect. See notes 129, 155 & accompa-
nying text infra. See also Delgado & Keyes, supra note 16, at 222-23.
1 See Delgado & Keyes, supra note 16, at 104. Delgado and Keyes, in addition to
discussing sex selection abortion, deal with similar abortion practices such as the possibility
of racially selective abortion.
3 Fletcher, supra note 17, at 551.
Personal correspondence from Rep. John T. Myers (R-Ind.) suggests this point. Letter
from Rep. John T. Myers (R-Ind.) (Nov. 5, 1979) (copy on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
36 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3 410 U.S. 179 (1973). Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton were companion cases.
3 Delgado & Keyes, supra note 16, passim; see notes 63-69 & accompanying text infra.
" E.g., J. NOONAN, supra note 8, at 20-32; Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any
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result in any abortion case may have more to do with the individual
Justices' subjective values concerning abortion than with substantive
constitutional issues." The result is a series of conceptually inconsistent
decisions which are not conducive to precise or rigid analysis. As Mr.
Justice White laconically lamented: "[The] normal rules of law, pro-
cedure, and constitutional adjudication suddenly become irrelevant sole-
ly because a case touches on the subject of abortion."1
Third, Supreme Court pronouncements on the scope of the abortion
liberty and the actual practice of the liberty in the real world are often
impossible to reconcile. Although the Court insists that Roe does not
give a woman the right to an "abortion on ... demand," 2 as a practical
matter any woman with sufficient funds43 has such a right. This in-
dicates a lack of candor in the Court's declarations.
The absence of doctrinal foundation for the abortion liberty and the
apparent disingenuousness of some language in the opinions must be
kept in mind so that the significance of a particular holding or passage is
not overemphasized. At the same time, the judicially created abortion
liberty is only as vital as the Court is willing to make it. Consequently, a
textual analysis of the Court's remarks concerning the liberty will
define its legal limits.
The Genesis of the Abortion Liberty: The Analytic
Foundations of Roe and Doe
The abortion liberty was established in Roe v. Wade and Doe v.
Bolton." In Roe, the Court decided that the "right of privacy" it had
discovered in the "Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty
and restrictions upon state action ... is broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."' '45 How-
Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 SuP. CT. REV. 159. Contra, Heyman & Barzelay,
The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its Critics, 53 B.U. L. REv. 765 (1973).
, See J. NOONAN, supra note 8, at 32.
, Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 98 (White, J., concurring & dissenting in
part).
42 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 189.
' See note 59 infra.
See generally J. NOONAN, supra note 8, at 5-7.
" 410 U.S. at 153. The Court never attempts to explain why this' right of privacy is
broad enough to encompass the abortion decision, it merely says that it is. Nor does the
Court give any hint as to what other activities this right is broad enough to encompass,
what factors are relevant to making such a judgment nor how the Court determines what
these factors are. Probably the reason the Court did not even attempt such an explanation
is that the abortion liberty is not rooted in a right of privacy at all. Rather, the Court ac-
tually is engaging in the substantive due process analysis of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45 (1905). See note 6 supra. As Mr. Justice White has noted, "The task of policing this
limitation on state police power is and will be a difficult and continuing venture in substan-
tive due process." Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 92 (1976) (White, J., dissent-
ing & concurring in part). The sole guidance provided by the Court in this regard was the
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ever, the Court ostensibly created a limited abortion liberty when it
"emphatically"'" rejected the contention that "the woman's right [to an
abortion] is absolute and that she is entitled to terminate her pregnancy
at whatever time, in whatever way, and for whatever reason she alone
chooses."' Although this language indicates there may be reasons for an
abortion which the Court would reject as impermissible, the Court has
never elaborated on the language, nor has it even remotely suggested
what such reasons might be. 8
A possible explanation of the language's import is the Court's view in
Roe that until "state interests provide compelling justifications for in-
tervention ... the abortion decision in all its aspects is inherently, and
primarily, a medical decision, and basic responsibility for it must rest
with the physician."'9 Thus, when the Court says that a woman does not
have a right to an abortion "for whatever reason she alone chooses," it
may mean simply that a doctor must exercise his independent medical
judgment.'
This position assumes there is a medical judgment to be made. It is
true that abortions are sometimes "medically indicated,"5 but Roe
struck down statutes which permitted abortions only for medical rea-
sons.52 Though some doctors think an abortion is medically indicated
statement that only those rights deemed "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" can be
ranked as fundamental. 410 U.S. at 152. The Court does not say how it reached the conclu-
sion that a woman's right to an abortion is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.
" The Court revealed that the contention mentioned in the text had been "emphatically"
rejected by the Roe Court in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 60 (1976). The
emphasis was not evident in Roe itself.
' 410 U.S. at 153 (emphasis added).
" The Court does say that the state may prohibit abortions during the third trimester of
pregnancy which are not necessary to preserve the life or health of the pregnant woman.
See text accompanying note 88 infra. Although the Court was speaking about abortion
generally when it said a woman does not have a right to an abortion "for whatever reason"
she chooses, it is possible that this quoted language was intended only to account for the
Court's recognition, later in its opinion, of permissible state regulation in the third
trimester. If this was the Court's intention, it was not made clear.
11 410 U.S. at 166. Indeed, the Court went so far as to say that its decision "vindicates
the right of the physician to administer medical treatment according to his professional
judgment" until the state has a compelling interest to intervene. Id. at 165. The Roe Court,
then, left at least some doubt as to whose rights were being protected-the woman's or her
physician's. See id. at 163, 164; Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 197. Plaintiff doctors in a later
case seized on this sweeping language about a physician's right to administer treatment.
The Court was forced to back off from its pronouncements in Roe and Doe about a
physician's rights and made clear that "the constitutional right vindicated" was not that of
the physician to administer treatment, but that of the woman to seek an abortion. Whalen
v. Roe, 429 U.S. 489, 604 n.33 (1977).
0 Indeed, the Court says that during the first trimester of pregnancy, "the abortion
decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's
attending physician." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 164.
5, It has been said, however, that "there are seldom any purely medical indications for
abortion." Nathanson, Deeper into Abortion, 291 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1189, 1189 (1974). See
also J. PRITCHARD & P. MACDONALD, supra note 15, at 497-99.
' See 410 U.S. at 116-18; accord, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 181-83.
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whenever a woman wants one,53 this is a misuse of the phrase which
obliterates the distinction between therapeutic and elective abortion.'
Indeed, the Court explicitly stated that "a pregnant woman does not
have an absolute constitutional right to an abortion on her demand"'
and further noted that "[i]f an individual practitioner abuses the
privilege of exercising proper medical judgment, the usual remedies,
judicial and intra-professional, are available.""8 Furthermore, the Chief
Justice, concurring in Roe and Doe, asserted that "the vast majority of
physicians . ..act only on the basis of carefully deliberated medical
judgments relating to life and health. Plainly, the Court today rejects
any claim that the Constitution requires abortions on demand."5
If these statements had been taken seriously, Roe would have merely
stood for the constitutional right to a therapeutic abortion. Such
statements are, however, impossible to reconcile with reality seven
years after the abortion liberty appeared on the constitutional scene, for
a woman now can obtain a first or second trimester abortion on
demand, 6 provided she can pay for it.59 Doctors are not exercising any
' A director of an abortion clinic has stated, "I feel there is a medical indication to abort
a pregnancy where it is not wanted." 125 CONG. REC. S9860 (daily ed. July 19, 1979).
1 Under the policy established by the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecol-
ogists, therapeutic abortions may be performed: first, when continued pregnancy threatens
the woman's life or may seriously impair her health; second, when health impairment is evi-
dent in cases of rape or incest; or third, when birth will likely result in a child with grave
physical deformities or mental retardation. J. PRITCHARD & P. MACDONALD, supra note 15,
at 499. "Elective or voluntary abortion is the interruption of pregnancy before viability at
the request of the woman but not for reasons of maternal health or fetal disease." Id.
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 189.
' Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 166. The Court did not explain what kind of "abuses" could
result in judicial or intra-professional remedial action given the wide-open nature of the
"medical judgment" to abort outlined by the Court. If the Court was suggesting that a
woman who asks a doctor to perform an abortion could later bring a tort action against him
for performing the abortion because he did not exercise proper medical judgment, such ac-
tions have not resulted in practice. If the Court envisioned that the medical community
would take action against a doctor for performing abortion on demand, the Court must have
been unaware of the well-known reluctance of physicians to discipline themselves. Note
that the Court refers to abuses of proper medical judgment, indicating a decisionmaking
role for the physician. Thus, the Court could not be referring to malpractice actions solely
based on negligence such as faulty surgical technique. Notably absent from the "usual
remedies," id. at 166, the Court lists is legislative protection. When the Court speaks of
judicial remedies, however, it evidently is referring to tort actions, and such causes of ac-
tion, especially in the medical malpractice area, find their origin in state statutes. The ex-
tent to which a state, through recognizing tort actions for abuse of medical judgment by
doctors in abortion cases, could discourage elective abortions has not been explored. Yet
the Court's pronouncements in Roe suggest that, unlike the use of criminal sanctions, such
civil sanctions could be used. See generally Ketchum v. Ward, 422 F. Supp. 934 (W.D.N.Y.
1976 (indicating criminal liability for faulty judgment by abortionist).
, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 208 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
' A woman has no right, of course, to force a particular physician to perform her abor-
tion, just as no one has a right to compel a doctor to take one as a patient. See, e.g., Olson v.
Molzen, 558 S.W.2d 429 (Tenn. 1977). However, there surely are more than enough physi-
cians willing to perform elective abortions, for a price, to accommodate the demand. Abor-
tions are less conveniently available in some geographical regions than in others.
" The Court has held that the state is not required to fund abortions. See text accompa-
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"medical judgment" whatsoever" in the one million elective abortions
performed each year." Roe actually held that a woman has a right to an
elective abortion which, by definition, does not call for any judgment by
the physician concerning the decision to abort. However, assuming the
Court was being forthright when it stated that a woman does not have a
right to abortion on demand, there must be some judicially recognizable
limits to this judicially created liberty.
The task of defining these limits begins with identifying the interests
of pregnant women which are infringed by state prohibition of elective
abortion. If prohibition of sex selection abortion does not intrude upon
these same interests, the state constitutionally may prohibit this prac-
tice. In concluding that a woman has a right to an elective abortion, the
Court was centrally concerned with the physical and psychological
detriments which would be imposed on a pregnant woman "by denying
[the abortion] choice altogether."62 Prohibition of sex selection amniocen-
tesis would not prevent a woman from obtaining an abortion "alto-
gether." She would still be free to obtain one. It would merely prevent
her from discriminating on the basis of sex in making the decision to
abort. Furthermore, the factors which the Court concludes "the woman
and her responsible physician necessarily will consider in consultation"63
in making an abortion decision are inapplicable to the preference a
woman might have for a child of a particular sex.64 The detriments listed
by the Court include the burdens and risks of pregnancy and childrearing
and the stigma of unwed motherhood. 5 Since a woman seeking a sex
hying notes 128-38 infra. However, several states do fund elective abortions. ANTENATAL
DIAGNOSIS, supra note 13, at 1-239; Washington Post, Jan. 9, 1980, § A, at 10, col. 1. While
selective abortion of severely deformed fetuses may be considered a therapeutic abortion,
sex selection abortion seems entirely elective. See notes 53-54 & accompanying text supra.
I The physician does, of course, decide on which technique to use in performing the
abortion, but this is not a judgment concerning the decision to abort. The decision to abort
was for the physician under Roe:
[T]he attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to deter-
mine, without regulation by the state, that, in his medical judgment, the pa-
tient's pregnancy should be terminated. If that decision is reached, the judg-
ment may be effectuated by an abortion free from interference by the State
[during the first trimester].
410 U.S. at 163. The Court later noted that in Roe, "[t]he participation by the attending
physician in the abortion decision, and his responsibility in that decision... were emphasized."
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 61 (1976).
" In 1978, the most recent year for which reliable estimates are available, there were
1,347,000 legal abortions, up 54,000 from 1977. Washington Post, Jan. 9, 1980, § A, at 10, col.
1. The vast majority of abortions are elective abortions. See Nathanson, supra note 51, at
1189.
62 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153 (emphasis added).
63 Id.
See Delgado & Keyes, supra note 16, at 221.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153. The Court also mentions psychological harm. For a
discussion of the issues raised by this factor, see note 93 infra. "In describing the nature of
the mother's interest in terminating a pregnancy, the Court in Roe v. Wade mentioned only
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selection abortion does not wish to avoid these detriments of
pregnancy,"6 the Court's analysis provides no constitutional basis for her
to claim a right to an abortion decision free from state interference.
Essential to this argument is the fact that Roe "rejected a [constitu-
tional right] based on [a woman's] interest in controlling her own body
during pregnancy," 7 and instead based the right on a balance the Court
struck between the burdens and risks of pregnancy and childrearing,
and the state interest in protecting maternal health and the unborn
child's "potential" life. Were the right based on bodily autonomy, it is
evident that state regulation of sex selection amniocentesis would in-
vade that right because the regulation would prevent the woman from
having a medical test performed on herself.
Rejecting the argument that a woman has a constitutional right to do
with her body as she pleases,68 the Court acknowledged:
[T]he State does have an important and legitimate interest in pre-
serving and protecting the health of the pregnant woman ... and ...
still another important and legitimate interest in protecting the poten-
the post-birth burdens of rearing a child .... Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,
94 (1976) (White, J., concurring & dissenting in part). A significant omission in the Court's
analysis is its assumption that the burdens it perceived must inherently follow the birth of
an unwanted child. The assumption is obviously faulty. A woman who has an unwanted
child can put it up for adoption or it could become a ward of the state. All the burdens, save
the stigma of unwed motherhood, vanish when one considers this simple alternative. There
would be emotional distress attendant with putting a child up for adoption, but there is also
emotional distress accompanying abortion. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF ABORTION
passim (D. Mall & W. Watts eds. 1979). Note further that
experimentation attempting artificially to mature aborted fetuses ... [makes
it] possible that a woman might seek an abortion to rid herself of ... a child
only to find the child subsequently adopted by others. The psychological im-
pact of such an occurrence would be considerable; indeed, the possibility of the
fetus surviving the abortion may obviate entirely the mother's reason for the
operation.
Note, Fetal Experimentation: Mora& Legal, and Medical Implications, 26 STAN. L. REV.
1191, 1204 (1974). Thus, it is not surprising that
[ilt is preposterous to many [abortion] advocates . . . that the state should
simultaneously permit abortions and require resuscitation of abortuses. The
very purpose of many of these abortions is the destruction of the fetus, and
this act seemingly is endorsed socially by the legal right to seek abortion. The
fact of expulsion from the womb seems insufficiently significant to change per-
mission to kill into a duty to save.
Wikler, Ought We Try to Save Aborted Fetuses?, 90 ETHICS 58, 60 (1979).
" A woman seeking a sex selection abortion wishes to have a child of a particular sex.
She is willing to endure the pregnancy and endure the burdens of childrearing. The stigma
of unwed motherhood also does not enter into her concerns-she is willing to give birth to a
child, if it is the "right" sex.
" Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 94 (1976) (White, J., concurring & dis-
senting in part). Indeed, the Court in Roe, favorably citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197
U.S. 11 (1905) (compulsory vaccination upheld), and Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (com-
pulsory sterilization upheld), rejected the notion that "one has an unlimited right to do with
one's body as one pleases .... " 410 U.S. at 154.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 154.
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tiality of human life [ie., the fetus]. Each grows in substantiality as
the woman approaches term and, at a point during pregnancy, each
becomes "compelling." 9
Balancing these factors, the Court found the compelling points divide
pregnancy into three parts (trimesters) for constitutional purposes.
This analytic division of the pregnancy state constitutes a constitutional
rule of law which determines the extent to which the government may
regulate abortion.
Implications of the First Trimester Rule
During the first trimester the state may assert its interest in mater-
nal health only by prohibiting abortion by unlicensed physicians.7 State
interference with the woman's right to an abortion is most severely cir-
cumscribed in the first trimester because the Court was persuaded that
the maternal mortality rate for first trimester abortions is lower than
the maternal mortality rate of pregnancies carried to term.2 This ra-
69 Id. at 162-63. It is important to recognize that the Court acknowledges that these state
interests exist throughout pregnancy, even though they do not become sufficiently compel-
ling to warrant the sanction of the criminal law until certain points in the pregnancy.
However, as later cases demonstrate, see notes 101-57 & accompanying text infra, even
these "compelling" points are not permanently fixed and may vary according to a balancing
by the Court of the nature of a woman's right and the state's interference with that right.
70 See 410 U.S. at 163. The first trimester ends at the twelfth week of pregnancy, the
second at the twenty-fourth week.
" See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 193, 197; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 163; accord, Cheaney
v. Indiana, 410 U.S. 991 (1973) (mem.); State v. Menillo, 171 Conn. 141, 368 A.2d 136 (1976)
(holding abortion statutes enforceable against nonphysicians). During the first trimester,
the state may not even require that an abortion be performed in a hospital. E.g., Emma G.
v. Edwards, 434 F. Supp. 1048 (E.D. La. 1977); Arnold v. Sendak, 416 F. Supp. 22 (S.D. Ind.
1976).
72 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 163. This relative mortality rate is "established medical
fact." Id. However, the Court fails to take account of the fact that "[t]oday it is possible for
almost any patient to be brought through pregnancy alive, unless she suffers from a fatal
illness ... and if so, abortion would be unlikely to prolong life much less save life." A. GUTT-
MACHER, ABORTION -YESTERDAY, TODAY, AND TOMORROW, quoted in 125 CONG. REC. S9860
(daily ed. July 19, 1979). Moreover, those few cases where abortion would be necessary to
preserve life are identifiable by the physician, see J. PRITCHARD & P. MACDONALD, supra
note 15, at 497, 499, 608-09, and in some of those cases, e.g., tubal and other ectopic
pregnancies, the fetus is doomed anyway, id. at 431-36. Thus, the Court's classification of
first trimester pregnancies on the basis of a general statistical mortality rate is overbroad.
The Court offers no reason why the state could not regulate abortion in those first trimes-
ter pregnancies in which the risk of maternal death is not greater than carrying the infant
to term. Under the Court's analysis, the state should be able to regulate such first
trimester pregnancies to the same extent it may regulate second trimester pregnancies.
Moreover, it is not entirely clear that there is a significant difference in mortality rates
between first trimester abortions and childbirth. Note first that figures for maternal mor-
tality "include deaths from abortion" which must, of course, be subtracted for comparison
purposes. D. REID, K. RYAN & K. BENIRSCHKE, PRINCIPLES AND MANAGEMENT OF HUMAN
REPRODUCTION 273 (1972). In addition, it has been contended that death certificates are inac-
curate in abortion cases and fail to note abortion as the cause of death. See, e.g., Duffy,
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tionale, however, has no application to sex selection abortion. 3 In the
typical case of sex selection abortion, the woman intends to carry a child
to term if it is the desired sex; if it is not, she has an abortion which en-
tails a risk of death. She then becomes pregnant again and again until
she "come[s] up with a lucky throw of the genetic dice." 4 Therefore, by
repeatedly becoming pregnant and having abortions, the risks to the
woman's life are greater, even for first trimester abortions, than if she
had carried the first child to term. Thus, applying the Court's reasoning,
the state should be able to assert its interest in maternal health to the
same degree it can in second trimester abortions-for the relative mor-
tality rate is the only factor Roe uses to distinguish the first and second
trimesters of pregnancy.
Application of the Second Trimester Reasoning
The Court in Roe held that during the second trimester,"5 the state
"may regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that the regulation
reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal
health."" The Court did not, however, intend what it said. Although sec-
ond trimester abortions are more dangerous to a woman's life than car-
rying the infant to term,7 the opinion does not explain why the state
may not, therefore, prohibit second trimester abortion. Instead, the
Court only permits the state to regulate the type of facility in which the
abortion may be performed and other similar matters." Thus, Roe
acknowledges that the state has a compelling interest in the health of
the mother in the second trimester and that the very reason it is com-
pelling is because second trimester abortions are more likely to cause
maternal death than carrying to term, and yet, the Court only permits
supra note 23, at 13-14. Also, one of the risks of abortion is miscarriage in subsequent
pregnancies, and the maternal mortality figures include deaths from such miscarriages. Id.
See also J. PRITCHARD & P. MACDONALD, supra note 15, at 512.
" First trimester sex selection amniocentesis is not technically feasible yet, but may
become so in the near future. See note 13 supra.
7 L. KARP, supra note 3, at 151. In some cases, however, especially in unplanned
pregnancies, the woman could decide to bear the child only if it were a particular sex; and if
it were not, she would abort that fetus and not become pregnant again.
75 The second trimester ends at 24 weeks, but the real distinction, for constitutional pur-
poses, between the second and third trimesters turns on the viability of the fetus. When
the Court refers to the second trimester, it refers to that period after the twelfth week of
pregnancy until fetal viability.
7" 410 U.S. at 163.
" The Court admits as much in distinguishing between first and second trimester abor-
tions on the basis of relative mortality rates. Id. The risk of death from second trimester
abortion is significantly greater than the risk from carrying to term. See J. PRITCHARD & P.
MACDONALD, supra note 15, at 3, 512 (maternal mortality rate for live births one in 6,900
compared to rate of one in 4,700 for second trimester abortions).
" See 410 U.S. at 163-64.
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this interest to be forwarded by hospital regulation. It does not allow
the state to take the action which would logically advance the compel-
ling interest that permits the state to assert its authority-prohibition
of this dangerous procedure. However, this apparently anomalous posi-
tion cannot be divorced from the conceptual framework of Roe. The
Court's premise regarding second trimester abortions is that a woman
has the right to incur the greater risk of death by having a second tri-
mester abortion because the continued burdens of pregnancy and child-
rearing, and the stigma of unwed motherhood can be so significant that
the state may not decide for her that the risk of abortion is not worth
taking. 9 The state's interest in maternal health is not viewed as being
sufficiently compelling for the state to prohibit the woman from obtain-
ing an abortion, even where childbirth is the safer alternative.
Sex selection abortion, however, can be distinguished on two grounds
and state prohibition of sex selection abortion can be viewed as reason-
ably related to maternal health. First, the risk of death in a typical sex
selection abortion situation, already higher than risk of death from
childbirth since these abortions are necessarily performed in the second
trimester, is compounded because the woman probably will incur the
risks of a second pregnancy following the abortion of the unwanted
fetus.0 Second, the burdens enumerated by the Court which give the
woman a constitutional right to risk her life are nonexistent."' Instead of
weighing the increased risk of death from abortion against potentially
significant burdens, the balance for sex selection abortions must be
struck between the increased risk of death from abortion and the possi-
ble benefits of having a child of a desired sex.
The benefits of sex selection abortion in most cases consist simply of
the happiness of the woman or perhaps the child's father.2 It cannot be
" Given the fact that the Court rejected the argument that one has a constitutional right
to bodily autonomy, see note 67 & accompanying text supra, it is difficult to discern any
possible constitutional foundation to the Court's unexpressed premise that a woman has a
right to risk her life in this regard. Were this rationale extended to other areas of the law,
state police power would be severely circumscribed because many health laws prohibit one-
from endangering one's life or health.
'o In addition, the state interest in the health of a woman presumably includes her
psychological and emotional well-being. See text accompanying note 89 infra. Abortion
causes serious psychological problems for some women. Liebman & Zimmer, The
Psychological Sequelae of Abortion: Fact and Fallacy, in THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF
ABORTION 127 (D. Mall & S. Watts eds. 1979). Depression has been notably evident in
women after second trimester abortions performed for genetic reasons. Fletcher, supra
note 17, at 552. The state, thus, could also assert prevention of psychological trauma as
another factor showing that the prohibition of sex selection amniocentesis is reasonably
related to maternal health.
" The only burden mentioned by the Court which might apply is psychological distress.
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153. Presumably even this concern is not broad enough to
cover the emotional distress associated with not having the ability to ensure the birth of
either a boy or girl. But see text accompanying note 93 infra.
"Familial adjustment" might also be considered a benefit of preventing the birth of a
child that is unwanted because of his or her sex. Such concerns could also be stated in the
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seriously contended, however, that the state is constitutionally impo-
tent to protect an individual's health by prohibiting her from engaging
in a certain activity simply because she would rather pursue a potential-
ly self-destructive course of action that makes her "happy." The state's
police power to protect the health of its citizens would evaporate were
such a proposition to gain constitutional stature.83
Moreover, the state's "important and legitimate" interest in the fetus,
which exists and grows throughout pregnancy84 and nearly reaches the
compelling point in the late second trimester when sex selection abor-
tion occurs, 5 also must be balanced against the mother's interest in the
sex of her offspring. While this state interest is constitutionally subor-
dinate to a woman's interest in avoiding the burdens of childbirth and
childrearing, it may be considered sufficiently important to outweigh a
woman's interest in the sex of her children.
A balancing of all of these factors indicates that a prohibition of sec-
ond trimester sex selection abortion could withstand constitutional
scrutiny. The procedure encourages women recklessly to endanger their
lives and the state may protect them from their own improvidence. Fur-
thermore, the procedure encourages the termination of potential life
and the state may protect potential life so long as doing so does not im-
pose significant burdens on the pregnant woman.
Third Trimester Abortions (Post-Viability Abortions)
A fetus normally achieves "viability" at the beginning of the third
negative: avoidance of familial disharmony due to the birth of an unwanted boy or girl.
However, any benefit can be stated as the absence of a burden in this way and such cir-
cumlocutions are unnatural in this context. The woman who wants a sex selection abortion
has a preference for a child of a particular sex and seeks the added benefits which that sex
has to offer. It is less likely she would view a child of the other sex as a "burden" because of
his or her sex.
Perhaps the most obvious example of such health laws is the prohibition of numerous
mind-altering substances. Other regulations in this category are occupational health rules.
84 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 162; accord, Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 445-46 (1977).
[Tihe State has a valid and important interest in encouraging childbirth. We
expressly recognized in Roe the "important and legitimate interest in protect-
ing the potentiality of human life" ..... That interest alone does not, at least
until approximately the third trimester, become sufficiently compelling to
justify unduly burdensome state interference with the woman's constitution-
ally protected privacy interest. But it is a significant state interest existing
throughout the course of the woman's pregnancy.
Id.
Although the Court in Roe says that state interest in the fetus does not become com-
pelling until viability, and thus cannot justify state prohibition until that point, it said this
in the context of weighing the burdens of denying the abortion choice altogether. In later
cases, the Court recognized that the state interest in the fetus can justify some state




trimester." When the fetus becomes viable, that is, "potentially able to
live outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid,""1 the state
may prohibit abortion unless "it is necessary to preserve the life or
health of the mother."' While this language appears to permit states to
prohibit elective abortions such as sex selection abortions during the
third trimester, the Court's view of "health" is broad: "[T]he medical
judgment may be exercised in the light of all factors-physical, emo-
tional, psychological, Jamilial, and the woman's age-relevant to the
well-being of the patient. All these factors may relate to health."8 The
state interest in the viable fetus is not very "compelling" if it can be
overridden by the "emotional well-being" of the woman. Under such an
interpretation it could be argued that a sex selection abortion, being
necessary for the woman's emotional well-being, may not be prohibited
by the state even after the fetus is viable. Once again, however, the
Court does not mean what it says, for if the post-viability distinction has
any substance at all,90 it must mean that the state may prohibit elective
abortions during the third trimester. An examination of the sex selec-
tion abortion issue vividly illustrates this point.
At least some sex selection abortions probably have been, and will be,
performed after the fetus has achieved viability." If a woman does not
want a child of a particular sex and is willing to abort it, her emotional
well-being, or at least her "familial" preferences, would be impaired if
she were prohibited from determining the sex of her fetus. However,
such a broad view of health, which the Court overtly embraces, is incon-
sistent with its distinction between pre-viability and post-viability abor-
tions. Of course, any woman who is denied an abortion that she desires
would have her emotional well-being thereby impaired to some degree.
If this is all that is meant by "health," however, there would be no
distinction between an elective third trimester abortion and a thera-
peutic one. Yet this is the very distinction which the Court must have
intended to make when it used the language "necessary to preserve the
life or health of the mother." Assuming the Court's recognition of a com-
pelling state interest in the viable fetus has any significance at all,92
U See note 15 supra.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 160. The Court also described a viable fetus as one
presumably capable of "meaningful life outside the mother's womb." Id. at 163. "Mean-
ingful" in this context evidently means prolonged, or more than momentary.
Id. at 164.
" Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 192. Although the quoted language was extracted from a
passage in which the Court was not speaking specifically about third trimester abortions,
the language nonetheless summarizes the Court's view on health in the abortion context.
0 At least one writer has indicated that the post-viability distinction the Court makes
has no substance, and that the restriction on third trimester abortions the Court seems to
perrfiit is "illusory." See, e.g., J. NOONAN, supra note 8, at 12.
" See Friedman, supra note 16, at 114-15; note 15 supra.
92 Contra, J. NOONAN, supra note 8, at 12. See generally Doe v. Deschamps, 461 F. Supp.
682 (D. Mont. 1976).
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something more than mere emotional upset must be necessary to over-
ride the interest.9 3
The Roe analysis of pre-viability abortions emphasizes the burdens of
childrearing and unwanted children." Until viability, these interests
override the state's interest in the fetus;95 upon viability, the state's in-
terest in the fetus becomes sufficiently compelling to override these in-
terests of the woman in not bearing the burdens of childrearing, but not
the woman's interest in her health for the duration of the pregnancy.
The distinction is crucial. A woman's interest in her immediate and
short term health is always paramount and at any point during preg-
nancy when an abortion becomes necessary to preserve that health-
that is, whenever her health is impaired by the actual state of pregnancy
itself-then she may obtain an abortion. On the other hand, the woman's
interests which are interfered with only if an unwanted birth occurs are
strong enough to give her a constitutional right to abort a nonviable
fetus, but not a viable one.
96
11 Before Roe, "mental health abortions" which were elective in all but name were per-
formed on a massive scale in the District of Columbia following the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971). See J. NOONAN, supra note 8, at 83. The
District of Columbia's abortion statute, D.C. CODE § 22-20 (1967), permitted abortions
necessary for the woman's health and Vuitch held the word "health" included mental
health. California and other states also permitted mental health abortions with similar
results. J. NOONAN, supra note 8, at 83.
. See note 65 & accompanying text supra.
95 In other words, it is only before viability that Roe "values the convenience, whim, or
caprice of the putative mother more than the life or potential life of the fetus .... Doe v.
Bolton, 410 U.S. at 221 (White, J., dissenting); see Note, supra note 65, at 1204.
" A woman may have a legal right to abort even a viable fetus because the state is not
required to protect the fetus, even after it is viable. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 163-64.
But, of course, the state is not required to protect anyone. Failure to recognize this fun-
damental concept of constitutional jurisprudence is a flaw in the Court's analysis. The
Court reasoned as follows. It declared that the "word 'person,' as used in the Fourteenth
Amendment, does not include the unborn." Id. at 158. It asserted that recognition of the
fetus as a person would constitutionally entitle it to state protection. Id. at 156-57. That is
simply false. The Constitution regulates interaction among branches of government and
limits the extent of government authority over individuals. It does not regulate interac-
tions among private individuals, with the exception of the thirteenth amendment and even
that provision is not self-executing. To say that a fetus is not a person only means that the
fetus is not protected from the exercise of governmental power. It says nothing regarding
whether the fetus can be protected by the government. Something does not have to be a
"person" for the state to protect it-indeed, it need not even be an animate object. It is
true that unless the state decides to extend its protection to a thing, be it a "person," a
stream or a fetus, individuals have a legal right to treat that thing any way in which they
choose. But that legal right disappears when the state extends its protection to the thing.
Moreover, even if the fetus were a "person," the only possible line of constitutional at-
tack which could require the state to extend protection to fetal life would be an equal pro-
tection clause analysis. The laws against homicide would be attacked on the distinction
made between the born and unborn, the state protecting the born and not the unborn.
Unless the Court were to hold that this is a "suspect" classification-something it would
hardly be compelled to do-the classification merely would have to withstand a rational
basis test. Surely there is a rational basis for distinguishing between the born and unborn;
indeed, the Court itself makes such a distinction. See generally Atkinson, Persons in the
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The reason for the distinction between pre-viability and post-viability
abortion stems from the nature of a viable fetus. The viable fetus is an
autonomous individual who, at the instant the abortion is to be performed,
will be born alive unless some deliberate action is taken to kill it before
delivery. 7 Thus, the woman's interest in not having an unwanted child
vanishes at viability because at that point she already has one, 8 even
though it is true that the child's health and potential for a lengthy life is
enhanced by it remaining in utero until term. The Court is thus willing
to permit the state to require the mother to care for this admittedly
autonomous, albeit underdeveloped, individual in the best way possible,
by carrying it to term, much as it would be willing to permit the state to
impose penalties on parents who neglect their children who have
already been born."
Viewed from this analytical framework, state prohibition of amnio-
centesis for the purpose of third trimester sex selection abortion would
withstand constitutional scrutiny. The reason the woman wants the sex
selection abortion has nothing to do with her physical state of preg-
nancy; it relates to the character of the child-he or.she is unwanted.
The mother's desire to abort a viable fetus because she does not want to
care for it after birth does not render an abortion necessary to preserve
her life or health in the context of Roe. Moreover, characterizing the
practice of sex selection abortion as sex discrimination gives added, but
Whole Sense, 22 AM. J. JuRis. 86 (1977); Gorby, The "Right" to an Abortion, The Scope of
Fourteenth Amendment 'Personhood," and the Supreme Court's Birth Requirement, 1979
So. ILL. L.J. 1; Note, Live Birth. A Condition Precedent to Recognition of Rights, 4
HOFSTRA L. REV. 805 (1976); see also WikIer, supra note 65, at 61-63 ("personhood" of infants
born alive following an abortion called into question).
" Intraamniotic injection of hypertonic saline is a popular technique for borderline
viability abortions. The expulsion of the fetus results from the fact that it is killed or
severely injured by being immersed in a toxic saline solution. See J. NO0NAN, supra note 8,
at 87, 137-39, 176; J. PRITCHARD & P. MACDONALD, supra note 15, at 504-05. In Planned Par-.
enthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), the Court struck down a ban on this method of
abortion. See note 105 & accompanying text infra.
" It is true that even a full-term fetus, while it is still in utero, is not a "[person] in the
whole sense," Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 162, under Court's analysis. Nevertheless, the Court
permits the state to protect such a creature anyway because its continued existence is no
longer dependent on the gravida. Even before viability, the mere fact that it is within a
woman's legal power to destroy the fetus by aborting it does not necessarily mean the fetus
is beyond state protection. See Note, The Right of the Fetus to Be Born Free of Drug
Addiction, 7 U. CAL. D.L. REV. 45 (1974). Indeed, "legal personality is not synonymous with
separate and vital existence within the womb ... depending on the circumstances involved,
public policy and other factors, legal personality will be accorded or withheld as these ex-
trinsic considerations demand." Byrn v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 38 A.D.2d
316, 329, 329 N.Y.S.2d 722, 734 (1972) (dictum).
" It could be argued that the state should only be able to prohibit a woman from abort-
ing a fetus until it is viable, for the very reason that it is no longer dependent upon her at
that point. This would, of course, be just the reverse of the Court's reasoning. Wikler,
supra note 65, at 62 n.7.
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unnecessary, strength to the power that the Court recognizes states
have to prohibit elective third trimester abortions."'
An analysis'of the abortion liberty in light of the cases which created
it, Roe and Doe, shows that the state may prohibit sex selection amnio-
centesis at any stage of pregnancy without interfering with the fun-
damental constitutional right to an abortion described in those cases.
However, since Roe and Doe, the character of the abortion liberty has
been modified by the Court. Far from undermining the argument ad-
vanced above, recent abortion decisions further buttress the conclusion
that state prohibition of sex selection abortions would be constitutional.
Refinement of the Abortion Liberty: Unduly Burdensome Regulation
In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,' the Court revised the trimester
approach to analysis developed in Roe. Although Roe had held that first
trimester abortions were essentially beyond state regulation, Danforth
held that a written consent requirement for an abortion, anytime during
pregnancy, was not unconstitutional unless it "unduly burdens the right
to seek an abortion."'0 ' The Court upheld first trimester recordkeeping
requirements as not unduly burdensome because it could "see no legally
significant impact or consequence on the abortion decision or on the
physician-patient relationship.""0 3 However, it held that a woman could
not be required to obtain her husband's or parent's consent before ob-
taining an abortion... and struck down a ban on a specific abortion
technique"5 because the ban was "designed to inhibit, and [had] the ef-
10 The fact that the "sex discrimination" in a sex selection abortion case is purely private
and involves no state action merely indicates that there is no constitutional infirmity to the
practice. The state, however, may, and does, prohibit private acts of sex discrimination. See
note 30 supra. The constitutional status of the fetus as a "nonperson" provides greater, but
not insuperable, conceptual problems. See note 189 infra.
101 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
11 Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 147 (1976) (stating the holding of Danforth, 428 U.S. at
67). The extent to which a state may require that a woman be informed of all the possible
consequences of abortion has been the subject of inconsistent rulings in the lower courts at-
tempting to apply the unduly burdensome rule. Compare Freiman v. Ashcroft, 584 F.2d 247
(8th Cir. 1978), and Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Ill. 1978), with Wolfe v. Schroer-
ing, 541 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1976).
"03 428 U.S. at 81.
10 Id. at 69, 74. The Court indicated that the state could not delegate a veto power over
the abortion decision to others (e.g., husbands, parents) which the state itself lacked. Id. at
70-71. The Court thus fails to distinguish between state recognition of the authority of
other institutions, like the family, and state delegation of authority. The state is viewed as
the root source of all authority. In addition, if the state is constrained from exercising
power in a particular way for some reason, it may not recognize the authority of other
societal institutions to exercise that power. The implications of this position are breathtak-
ing, but outside the scope of this note.




fect of inhibiting, the vast majority of abortions [in the second
trimester]."' Thus, the Court upheld state regulation of abortion, ir-
respective of trimester, where the regulation did not unduly discourage
or prevent abortions, but struck down regulations which had the effect
of preventing abortions.
State prohibition of sex selection amniocentesis would not unduly
burden a woman's right to seek an abortion because she still would be
absolutely free to obtain one. For such a woman, however, the freedom
to have an abortion would be an empty liberty; without knowledge of
the unborn child's sex, she would not know whether she wanted an abor-
tion. Accordingly, the state prohibition would leave her with a difficult
choice; either she bears the child, assuming the risk it will be the
"6wrong" sex, or she has an abortion and risks destroying a child she
really wanted. '1 A state regulation of abortion is not constitutionally in-
firm merely because it makes the abortion decision more difficult. In-
deed, the informed consent requirement upheld in Danforth.. was
designed to influence a woman's abortion decision and could discourage
a woman from having an abortion, but the Court did not consider this an
undue burden. Although this key word in the Court's verbal formula is
devoid of intrinsic meaning, an examination of further specific applica-
tions of the unduly burdensome concept will reveal what the Court in-
tended."0 9
The unduly burdensome concept was given additional substance in
Bellotti v. Baird,10 where the Court invalidated a statute dealing with
the difficult question of a minor's access to abortion."' The statute re-
quired a minor seeking an abortion to obtain parental consent. If con-
'" 428 U.S. at 79. The Court reached this conclusion in part because the state had failed
to prove to its satisfaction that the admittedly safer prostaglandin method of abortion was
widely available in the state at the time of the trial. Id. at 76-79.
107 In either case, of course, the "odds" would be roughly 50-50. Currently, some women
who are refused sex selection amniocentesis by physicians must face this choice. In fact,
some physicians perform the procedure because women threaten to abort unless the am-
niocentesis is performed. Washinton Post, Sept. 6, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 1.
In most cases ... those doctors who agree to do amniocentesis only to deter-
mine a fetus's sex do so reluctantly. In the typical case, one or both parents
are highly disturbed people who threaten to end the pregnancy in any case
unless they can be sure the child is the desired sex.
Id. Of course, it is unknown how many of these threats are acted upon.I"G See text accompanying note 102 supra.
IN Lower court applications of the unduly burdensome rule evidence its vagueness. See,
e.g., West Side Women's Servs. Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 450 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Ohio 1978)
(holding ordinance prohibiting abortion clinic from operating in retail district did not un-
duly burden the right to seek an abortion).
I 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
Il Eight of the Justices thought the statute was unconstitutional based on past decisions.
There were two major opinions, one by Mr. Justice Powell, the other by Mr. Justice
Stevens. Each opinion commanded the support of four Justices.
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sent were denied, the statute provided that a judge could authorize an
abortion "for good cause shown.. 12
Although this particular statutory scheme was held unconstitutional,
a majority of the Justices thought a legislative resolution of this issue
could withstand constitutional scrutiny. " ' Four members of the Court,
in an opinion written by Justice Powell, took the position that a statute
would not unduly burden a minor's right to seek an abortion if it provided
for the following procedure. "4 A minor must be given the opportunity to
demonstrate to the state that she is "mature and well enough informed
to make intelligently the abortion decision on her own . . . ."i' If she
meets these criteria, she "must [be] authorize[d] . . .to [have the abor-
tion] without parental consultation or consent.'.. If she does not meet
these criteria, "she must be permitted to show that an abortion never-
theless would be in her best interests." 7 Then a state official would
decide whether to authorize an abortion. "8
..2 Act of August 2, 1974, ch. 706, § 1, 1974 Mass. Acts 713 (amended version at MASS.
ANN. LAws ch. 112, § 12S (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1981)), quoted in 443 U.S. at 625-26.
"' There was no majority opinion. Mr. Justice White, dissenting, saw no constitutional
infirmity in the invalidated statute. 443 U.S. at 657 (White, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice
Rehnquist also subscribed to this view; however, he joined in the Powell plurality opinion
so that states would have some "guidance" regarding the constitutional rules in this area.
Id. at 652 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Five members of the Court, the four Justices in the
Powell plurality and Mr. Justice White, maintained a statutory resolution of the issue of a
minor's access to abortion could be constitutional.
.14 See id. at 648-50 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
11 Id. at 647 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
16 Id. (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
11 Id. at 647-48 (Powell. J., concurring in the judgmeint).
.. Id at 648 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). The other major opinion in the case
criticized the Powell group for speculating as to the constitutionality of this hypothetical
scheme. Id. at 656 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). This hypothetical system is
useful for purposes of analyzing the sex selection abortion issue. Suppose in the course of a
hearing to determine whether a minor is "mature and well enough informed" to make an
abortion decision, it is learned that the reason she wants the abortion is that she wants a
baby girl, but has discovered she is carrying a boy. An official would have to decide
whether this reason indicated sufficient maturity, and in making that decision, the official's
subjective value preferences regarding sex selection would color, if not determine, his deci-
sion. See id. at 655 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). If the official decides this
reason for an abortion indicates a lack of maturity, then he would have to decide whether
the "abortion nevertheless would be in her best interest." Several problems would then
present themselves. First, it is far from clear that the state constitutionally could order an
abortion based on the semi-suspect classification of sex. See note 189 infra. Second, the
judge could decide that the abortion would be in the minor's best interest because she
would be unhappy with a child of the wrong sex, but this would be tantamount to admitting
she was mature enough to make the decision in the first place. Third, if the official decides
to deny the abortion because sex selection is not a permissible reason for an abortion,
though this could be phrased in terms of the child's "best interest," the proposition is
established that the state may make the judgment that this reason for abortion can be
legally condemned. Again, the official's subjective value preferences would color his deci-
sion and at least some judges would refuse to order what they might consider to be a sexist
practice. If an administrative official can determine that sex selection abortion is imper-
missible in an individual case, then the legislature constitutionally may proscribe the prac-
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A majority..9 of the Court therefore embraces the idea that the state
may veto a minor's decision to have an abortion, but it must do so on a
case-by-case basis. If a minor is unable to obtain parental consent, and if
a state official decides she is immature and that an abortion would not
be in her best interests,20 she may be prohibited from obtaining one.
Significantly, the state official who can exercise the veto power over the
minor's decision does not have to be a judge. The Powell plurality
specifically states that the legislature could delegate this function to "an
administrative agency or official... 2 ' Thus, the legislature may establish
an extra-judicial system which has the power to review the abortion
decisions of an entire class of individuals.
Bellotti sheds light on the constitutionality of prohibiting sex selec-
tion abortion because it indicates that the state may impose great
burdens on the right to seek an abortion without infringing on the abor-
tion liberty. The Justices admit that a minor has a right to seek an abor-
tion without undue state interference." However, forcing a minor to ob-
tain the consent of either her parents or the state before obtaining an
abortion, as a practical matter, imposes a tremendous burden on many
minors." Yet a majority of the Court would not consider this to be an
undue burden. Furthermore, the state in some cases may go so far as to
deny a minor an abortion without unduly burdening her right to seek
one. These constraints may be placed on the minor even though the
burdens of pregnancy and childrearing may be especially acute for a
minor. 2' Bellotti then suggests that the state may interfere significantly
with an abortion decision if the specific situation justifies the state in-
tervention.'" The legislature, through its surrogate officials, may veto
the abortion decision of a minor because she only has a right to seek an
abortion, not a right to obtain one. The right to seek an abortion is cir-
cumscribed by the nature of her interests in the particular circumstan-
ces.
Within this conceptual structure, sex selection amniocentesis pre-
tice generally. The same state interests which would constitutionally legitimize the decision
of an administrative officer in this regard would also be available to the legislature.
' See note 113 supra.
"2 Note that "[the best interest of the child] standard provides little real guidance to the
judge, and his decision must necessarily reflect personal and societal values and mores ....
433 U.S. at 655 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 643 n.22 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
.. Id. at 639-47 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
" Id. at 655 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). Mr. Justice Stevens suggests that
the burden of going to the state official may be even greater than the burden of obtaining
parental consent. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
224 Id. at 642 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
"' In the case of a minor, the state has significant interests in the abortion decision, in-
cluding ensuring the minor is fully informed about the consequences of abortion, protecting
the minor from her own improvidence and safeguarding the family unit and parental
authority. Wynn v. Carey, 582 F.2d 1375 (7th Cir. 1978).
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sents a specific situation which justifies state intervention. A prohibi-
tion of this practice would not deny the abortion alternative completely;
rather, it would constitute state interference in the decisionmaking pro-
cess. However, this intrusion in the abortion decision is moderate com-
pared with the burdens which may be imposed under Bellotti. While ac-
cording to Bellotti a minor's abortion decision is subject to a potentially
complete review and veto by the state, a prohibition of sex selection am-
niocentesis would deny a woman knowledge of only one fact that might
influence her abortion decision.
Admittedly, Bellotti is limited in its applicability to other abortion
issues because the Court was confronted with the special legal problems
posed by minors. When read in conjunction with other recent abortion.
decisions,126 however, Bellotti indicates that a majority of the Court is
willing to allow increasingly burdensome state interference with the
abortion liberty.
The Abortion Funding Cases: Government Obstacles to Abortion
and State Encouragement of Normal Childbirth
In Maher v. Roe," the Court held that the state need not fund elective
abortions simply because it provides funds to indigent women for child-
birth, explaining that the abortion liberty
can be understood only by considering both the woman's interest and
the nature of the State's interference with it. Roe did not declare an
unqualified "constitutional right to an abortion . . . ." Rather, the
right protects the woman from unduly burdensome interference with
her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy. It implies
no limitation on the authority of a State to make a value judgment
favoring childbirth over abortion, and to implement that judgment by
the allocation of public funds.2"
The Court concluded that the state funding arrangement was different
from abortion provisions previously invalidated in that it "places no
obstacles-absolute or otherwise-in the pregnant woman's path to an
abortion.""u
Similarly, a ban on sex selection amniocentesis places no obstacle in
the pregnant woman's path to an abortion; she is still free to obtain one.
12 For a discussion of these decisions, see notes 127-34 & accompanying text infra.
127 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
" Id. at 473-74; accord, Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 156 Cal.
Rptr. 73 (Cal. App. 1979) (holding same principle applies under state constitution).
" 432 U.S. at 474. "Although a state created obstacle [to abortion] need not be absolute
to be impermissible ... a requirement for a lawful abortion 'is not unconstitutional unless it
unduly burdens the right to seek an abortion.'" Id. at 473 (citations omitted). Contra, id. at
481 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (Roe and Doe "simply require that a State not create an ab-
solute barrier to a woman's decision to have an abortion").
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Yet it .would prevent some women-those who decide to bear the child
and have one of the "wrong" sex-from having abortions that they
otherwise would have had. However, this may not be the kind of in-
fluence on the abortion decision that the Court would reject, for it noted
in Maher that the state may have a legitimate interest in demographics
which could be asserted in an abortion case.' 0 The demographic ramifi-
cations of sex selection'3 thus could influence the Court in determining
whether a ban on sex selection amniocentesis is unduly burdensome.
Moreover, the Maher opinion conceded that the state funding scheme
"may have made childbirth a more attractive alternative, thereby in-
fluencing the woman's [abortion] decision"'3 and held that it is "abun-
dantly clear that a State is not required to show a compelling interest
for its policy choice to favor normal childbirth ... .""' The same reason-
ing applies to state prohibition of sex selection amniocentesis. The state
may have made childbirth a more attractive alternative and therefore
influenced the woman's decision, but under the rationale of Maher this
does not render state action constitutionally infirm. Furthermore, it is
not necessary for the state to show a compelling state interest for its
policy choice favoring normal childbirth which results in a balanced sex
ratio.
While Maher held that the state may refuse to fund elective abor-
tions, in Harris v. McRae" the Court retreated further from an expan-
sive reading of Roe and upheld a congressional scheme (the Hyde
Amendment'3) funding childbirth expenses but prohibiting the use of
,1 Id. at 478 n.11 (majority opinion). The Court specially mentions population growth
rates and says "[s]uch concerns are basic to the future of the state .... Id.; see id. at 489
n.* (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"' See note 23 & accompanying text supra.
,12 432 U.S. at 474.
"I Id. at 477. Furthermore, in upholding special requirements for government funded
abortions, the Court said that "[t]he simple answer to the argument that similar re-
quirements are not imposed for other medical procedures is that such procedures do not in-
volve the termination of a potential human life." Id. at 480. Mr. Justice Brennan noted that
"[s]ince only the first trimester of pregnancy is involved in this case, that justification [the
state interest in the fetus] is totally foreclosed if the Court is not overruling the holding of
Roe v. Wade [that this interest becomes compelling at viability]." Id. at 489-90 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
'3 100 S. Ct. 2671 (1980).
'3 Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 923, 926 (1979) (applicable during fiscal year 1980);
Pub. L. No. 95-480, § 210, 92 Stat. 1567, 1586 (1978) (applicable during fiscal year 1979 and
part of fiscal year 1978); Pub. L. No. 95-205, § 101, 91 Stat. 1460, 1460 (1977) (applicable during
part of fiscal year 1978); Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1418, 1434 (1976) (applicable dur-
ing fiscal year 1977). See also Pub. L. No. 95-165, § 106, 91 Stat. 1323, 1324 (1977); Pub. L.
No. 95-130, § 106, 91 Stat. 1153, 1154 (1977) (continuing resolutions applicable during part of
fiscal year 1978). Beginning in 1976, Congress adopted a series of riders to appropriations
measures which prohibited the use of federal funds for abortions in most circumstances.
Harris v. McRae, 10Q S. Ct. at 2680. This funding restriction is known as the Hyde Amend-
ment. Id'Three versions of the Hyde Amendment were at issue in McRae. Id. at 2692 n.27;
see id. at 2681 n.4.
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government funds to pay for medically necessary abortions during any
trimester of pregnancy. As in Maher, the Court rejected the argument
that since such funding discourages abortions, it unconstitutionally in-
terferes with a woman's decision to obtain an abortion: applying the
Maher analysis which distinguished between government imposed
obstacles to abortion and government encouragement of normal child-
birth, the majority held that the funding scheme "does not impinge on
the due process liberty recognized in [Roe]."'' The majority reached this
conclusion accepting, arguendo, the proposition that the interest of a
woman in protecting her health during pregnancy is at the "core of the
constitutional liberty identified in [Roe]."'3 7 The funding scheme upheld
in McRae is, of course, at odds with this interest of the woman; it not
only denies her assistance for medically necessary abortions, it also en-
courages her to continue her pregnancy to term-and thereby damage
her health-by funding childbirth expenses.'38 Nevertheless, this
government action conflicting with the interest of a woman in protect-
ing her health during pregnancy was found not to violate the abortion
liberty.
The Court thus views as crucial the distinction between government
imposed obstacles to abortion and government interference in the abor-
tion decision. The abortion liberty only forbids imposition of obstacles to
obtaining an abortion, and then only where the obstacles are unduly
burdensome. Governmental actions which merely influence the abortion
decision do not impinge on the due process liberty recognized in Roe.
A prohibition of sex selection amniocentesis would not impose an
obstacle to obtaining an abortion; it would merely represent a govern-
ment attempt to influence the abortion decision. Certainly this govern-
ment interference in the abortion decision is less intrusive than that
upheld in McRae. The Hyde Amendment, "both by design and in effect
... serves to coerce indigent pregnant women to bear children that they
would otherwise elect not to have"'39 and thereby causes such women to
damage, in some cases severely, their health."' In contrast, a prohibi-
tion of sex selection amniocentesis would promote maternal health.'
In order to uphold the Hyde Amendment against the argument that it
constituted a denial of equal protection, the Court had to find that it was
"rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective."'4 The Court
held that "the Hyde Amendment, by encouraging childbirth except in
'3' 100 S. Ct. at 2689.
,s Id. at 2688.
'8 See id. at 2702-04 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"3 Id. at 2702 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2706 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
". See notes 77-80 & accompanying text supra.
"2 100 S. Ct. at 2692.
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the most urgent circumstances, is rationally related to the legitimate
governmental objective of protecting potential life." ' Protection of the
potential life of the fetus was recognized as a legitimate governmental
interest in Roe. However, Roe "squarely held that the [government]
may not protect that interest when a conflict with the interest in a preg-
nant woman's health exists.'. 4 Thus, McRae represents a significant
retreat from the analytical basis of Roe. The government now may pur-
sue its interest in the fetus-during any trimester of pregnancy-even
when doing so harms the woman's health. After McRae, the only limita-
tion on the state's power in this regard is the method by which it can ac-
complish this objective.
It could be argued that a prohibition of sex selection abortion, by
declaring a certain reason for abortion to be impermissible, affects a
woman's freedom of choice more significantly than does the Hyde
Amendment. However, the Court's holding in McRae implicitly rejects
this reasoning. One version of the Hyde Amendment upheld in McRae
permitted government funded abortions in cases of rape or incest.14 The
government, by making the value judgment that these reasons for abor-
tion are justifiable, is making a value judgment that other reasons for
abortion are not permissible. The Court thus upheld a scheme which
discriminates on the basis of the reason for which a woman seeks an
abortion. Accordingly, the government may encourage abortions sought
for some reasons, and discourage abortions sought for less compelling
reasons.
On the other hand, Maher and McRae distinguish between "direct
state interference with a protected activity and state encouragement of
an alternative activity [because] [c]onstitutional concerns are greatest
when the State attempts to impose its will by force of law; the State's
power to encourage actions deemed to be in the public interest is
necessarily far broader." 4 State compulsion is thus a primary concern.
By denying a woman access to amniocentesis for sex determination, the
state does not compel her to bear a child, but it does prevent her from
ensuring that the child she does bear is of the desired sex. The prohibi-
143 Id.
' Id. at 2713.
,, Id. at 2680; see Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 923 (1979).
, 100 S. Ct. at 2687 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 475-76).
[This] distinction between active state interference versus passive refusal to
assist in the exercise of a constitutional right would have been more convinc-
ing if the state refused to fund childbearing as well. While it may be true that
the State can encourage childbearing for a valid reason, e.g., a need for popula-
tion growth, it is questionable whether, as attempted here, it can do so
because it morally disapproves of abortion.
Gordon, The Nature and Uses of Congressional Power Under Section Five of the Four-




tion would, in effect, compel her either to risk bearing an unwanted
child or risk aborting a wanted one. Viewed from this perspective, the
prohibition might appear to be constitutionally infirm. However, when
one assesses the practical results of Maher and McRae on indigent
women, a different conclusion is apparent.
The dissenting Justices in the abortion funding cases referred to
them as "new law"'47 which "seriously erodes the principles that Roe
and Doe announced to guide the determination of what constitutes an
unconstitutional infringement of the ... right of a ... woman to be free
to decide whether to have an abortion."'48 Rejecting the majority's
distinction between compulsion and state encouragement of childbirth,
Justice Brennan pointed out: "[T]he discriminatory distribution of the
benefits of governmental largesse can discourage the exercise of fun-
damental liberties just as effectively as can an outright denial of those
rights through criminal and regulatory sanctions."'49 Justice Marshall
stated that as a practical matter the regulations upheld by the Court
"are little different from a total prohibition [of abortion] from the view-
point of the poor"' 50 and that the "predictable result of the Hyde Amend-
ment will be a significant increase in the number of poor women who
will die or suffer significant health damage . . . .""' The dissenters fur-
ther noted that the regulations were the result of a "deliberate policy
based on opposition to ... abortions on moral grounds by [government]
officials.""'
Whatever else a ban on sex selection amniocentesis would cause, it
would not deny the abortion choice altogether to an entire class of
citizens, nor would it cause health damage to pregnant women. Yet the
.. E.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 487 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Harlan's
words that "one in dissent is sometimes prone to overdraw the impact of a decision with
which he does not agree," Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 793 (1962) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting), should be kept in mind when reading the dissents' characterizations of the abor-
tion funding cases. Moreover, it has been noted that "[i]t is more realistic to regard [the
abortion] funding cases as a reflection of the political delicacy of the Court's interfering in
Congress' appropriating function, rather than as a retreat from the principles of [Roe and
Doe]." C. RICE, supra note 20, at 102. But see notes 155-56 & accompanying text infra.
"' Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 484 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Indeed, Mr. Justice Brennan
asserts that "[n]one can take seriously the Court's assurance that its 'conclusion signals no
retreat from Roe or the cases applying it.'" Id. at 483 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted). Contra, Framingham Clinic, Inc. v. Board of Selectmen, 373 Mass. 279, 288, 367
N.E.2d 606, 612 (1977) (maintaining that the abortion funding cases did not overrule the
principles of Roe that the state may not interpose material obstacles to a woman's right to
seek an abortion).
"' Harris v. McRae, 100 S. Ct. at 2704 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1 Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 457 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Indeed, Mr. Justice Mar-
shall was "appalled at the ethical bankruptcy of those who preach a 'right to life' that
means, under present social policies, a bare existence in utter misery for so many poor
women and their children." Id. at 456-57.
"' Harris v. McRae, 100 S. Ct. at 2706 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
... Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 523 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Court in Maher and McRae upheld regulations which had these effects.
Thus, even though a prohibition of sex selection amniocentesis, as a
practical matter, would prevent'5 3 some women from having abortions
that they otherwise would have, under the abortion funding cases this
fact is not enough to render the scheme unconstitutional.
Perhaps the underlying reason the effective prohibition of abortions
for indigent women was not held unconstitutional in Maher and McRae
was that the Court was having second thoughts about its latest "ven-
ture in substantive due process"'" which began with Roe. In McRae, the
Court essentially rejected the interest balancing analysis which was the
basis of its holding in Roe, stating that a court goes "beyond the judicial
function" when it makes an independent appraisal of the competing in-
terests of preserving a fetus and protecting maternal health.'55 The
Court in Maher found that the decision to fund abortions is "fraught
with judgments of policy and value over which opinions are sharply
'3 The analogy may be attacked on the ground that in the case of abortion funding, the
state does not "prevent" the woman from having an abortion, it only "encourages" her not
to have one. The fact that precisely the same could be said of a state prohibition of sex
selection amniocentesis does not end analysis, however. For a state prohbition of sex selec-
tion amniocentesis would prevent certain kinds of abortions-sex selection abortions. The
strength of the analogy, while diminished by this fact, still remains. Throughout the abor-
tion cases, the Court is vitally concerned with practical effects-the effects of childrearing,
unwed motherhood and unwanted pregnancies. These practical effects are just as real to in-
digent women as they are to those who can afford abortions, but the Court permits the
state to deny abortions to the indigent by leaving the marketplace undisturbed.
u Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 92 (1976) (White, J., dissenting & concur-
ring in part). As the abortion funding controversy and the 13 state petitions calling for a
constitutional amendment on abortion demonstrate, the abortion issue remains an intensely
political one. See J. NOONAN, supra note 8, at 180. The Court's apparent change in direction
might be a response to this political reality. As Mr. Dooley said, "No matther whether th'
constitution follows th' flag or not, th' supreme coort follows th' iliction returns." F. DUNNE,
MR. DOOLEY ON IVRYBODY AND IVRYTHING 160 (1963).
1' 100 S. Ct. at 2693. The district court in McRae had concluded that "[t]he interests of...
the federal government ... in the fetus and in preserving it are not sufficient, weighted in
the balance with the woman's threatened health, to justify withdrawing medical assistance
unless the woman consents ... to carry the fetus to term." Id. The Supreme Court responded
that "[iun making an independent appraisal of the competing interests involved here, the
District Court went beyond the judicial function. Such decisions are entrusted under the
Constitution to Congress, not the courts." Id Roe, of course, made just such an appraisal. It
concluded that the interest of the state in the fetus is not sufficient, weighed in balance
with the woman's health, to justify prohibiting abortion-even in the third trimester. The
Court fails to explain adequately why its balancing is permissible and that of the district
court is not. Surely the presence in Roe of a criminal sanction cannot be a principled basis
for distinguishing the situations. The abortion statute in Roe was held unconstitutional
because of its effect-causing women to carry to term where they would have chosen abor-
tion-and not because of its punitive nature. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 472-73. The
funding scheme in McRae has the same effect. Moreover, that the Court's repudiation of in-
terest balancing was made while discussing the rational basis of the legislation for equal
protection purposes does not diminish its relevance to a due process analysis, for rational
basis analysis has been the traditional test for determining the constitutionality of legisla-
tion under the due process clause. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 171, 173 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). See generally Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955).
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divided ... when an issue involves policy choices as sensitive as those
implicated by public funding of non-therapeutic abortions, the ap-
propriate forum for their resolution in a democracy is the legislature."'"
Thus, the Court explicitly recognizes in Maher and McRae that at least
some controversies surrounding abortion are not amenable to a judicial
resolution. These cases indicate that the Court is unwilling to liberally
interpret Roe in order to strike down government actions which merely
interfere with the abortion decisionmaking process. Instead of an expan-
sive view of the abortion liberty, the Court seems content to let Roe
stand only for its narrow result-that the state may not outlaw abortion
generally. Given this conception of the abortion liberty, a prohibition of
sex selection amniocentesis should survive constitutional challenge.
Such a prohibition would constitute, at most, governmental interference
in the decisionmaking process of a woman considering the option of
abortion; it would not prohibit the abortion alternative entirely.
In Maher and McRae, the Court upheld statutory schemes which ef-
fectively denied the abortion alternative to millions of indigent women
and in Bellotti a majority of the Justices indicated they were prepared
to uphold a statute that would have a similar effect on millions of
minors.157 If the Court is willing to uphold such schemes, it would be in-
congruous for it to strike down a prohibition of sex selection amniocen-
tesis which would not deny the abortion alternative to women, but
would only prevent a woman from ensuring the birth of a child of a par-
ticular sex.
SEX SELECTION AMNIOCENTESIS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Under Roe and its progeny, it appears that the state constitutionally
may prohibit sex selection abortion. Such a prohibition would neither be
inconsistent with the Court's balancing of interests in Roe nor would it
unduly burden a woman's right to seek an abortion as that right was
discussed in recent cases. However, this conclusion does not end the in-
quiry into the constitutionality of a state prohibition against the use of
amniocentesis for the purpose of sex selection abortion.
The only practical way of preventing sex selection abortions is by pro-
hibiting the use of medical testing for determining a fetus' sex when
" 432 U.S. at 479. Given the substantive due process basis of Roe, the significance of the
quoted passage cannot be overemphasized. The Court's attitude toward the propriety of
judicial resolution of questions related to abortion will likely color future abortion decisions
far more than the narrow holdings of past cases.
Compare Mr. Justice Marshall's perspective: "When elected leaders cower before public
pressure, this Court, more than ever, must not shirk its duty to enforce the Constitution for
the benefit of the poor and powerless." Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. at 462 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing).
"' See notes 110-43 & accompanying text supra.
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these tests are sought for the sole purpose of identifying fetal sex.'56
Such a prohibition would make an exchange transaction between a
woman and a laboratory illegal. Many laws proscribe exchange transac-
tions; however, in this case, the purchaser ultimately seeks, not an or-
dinary product, but rather, information about the fetus she carries.
Thus, while technically the performance of a specific medical test is pro-
hibited, the purpose of this prohibition is to keep the pregnant woman
ignorant of a fact she wants to know. Although a person does not have a
constitutional right to buy any information he or she wants, '59 in a series
of cases the Supreme Court has protected an individual's interest in the
free flow of commercial information. 60 A prohibition of sex selection am-
niocentesis can be attacked on the ground that it -constitutes an un-
constitutional infringement of this first amendment interest.6 '
These first amendment concerns led the Court in Bigelow v.
Virginia'62 to hold unconstitutional a law restricting advertisements of
'" Even with this approach, enforcement problems can be anticipated. For example, on
the pretext that she is concerned about possible x-linked genetic disease, see note 17 supra,
a woman could ask for information regarding fetal sex. But such enforcement problems
would not be insurmountable. First, it is unlikely that many individuals would be so
knowledgeable about genetic engineering and the different uses of amniocentesis. Second,
even if this information were to become widely known, documentation to prove a medical
history of x-linked disease could be required. Third, most physicians now oppose sex selec-
tion abortion, see note 18 supra, and prohibition of the practice would encourage their own
inclinations to be skeptical of such requests, in light of the fact that only 2% of am-
niocenteses are now performed for x-linked genetic reasons, ANTENATAL DIAGNOSIS, supra
note 13, at 1-41. Prohibition would prevent individuals from pointing to the very legality of
the practice as an ethical reason for doctors to perform the procedure. See note 19 supra. In
addition, the law, reflecting society's condemnation of the practice, would discourage some
women from seeking the procedure which would otherwise perhaps be considered socially
acceptable. See generally Frankel, The Moral Environment of Law, 61 MINN. L. REv. 921,
942-46 (1977).
,' Many state adoption laws, for example, prevent an adoptee from discovering the
identity of his or her parents. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8-40.1 (West Supp. 1980-1981),
held constitutional in Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302,
372 A.2d 646 (1977). See also 16 J. FAM. L. 615 (1977-78).
60 See text accompanying note 11 supra. See generally Note, Listeners' Rights Pro-
viding a State Action Theory in the "Company Town" Analogues, 55 IND. L.J. 91, 106-07
(1979).
"6 The prohibition could also be attacked as an interference with the doctor-patient rela-
tionship. Mr. Justice Douglas maintained that "[t]he right to privacy has no more con-
spicuous place than in the physician-patient relationship, unless it be in the priest-penitent
relationship." Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 219 (Douglas, J., concurring). However, these
concerns, in the abortion context, must be analyzed in terms of Roe and the first amend-
ment interest in the free flow of information that has been recognized by the entire Court.
While Roe emphasized the role of the physician in the abortion decision, later cases made
clear that the doctor-patient relationship was not a determinative factor in the Court's
reasoning. See note 49 supra. Moreover, amniocentesis services are more properly regard-
ed as exchange transactions, as would be the dispensing of medication or the performance
of a medical procedure which may be regulated by the states. But see Wynn v. Scott, 449 F.
Supp. 1302, 1310 (1978) (suggesting in dicta that "live, oral communication between a physi-
cian and patient" may raise different constitutional concerns than other forms of com-
munication).
6 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
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abortion services. Distinguishing prior cases on "commercial speech,"'"
the Court said that the advertisement in this case "did more than simp-
ly propose a commercial transaction. It contained factual material of
clear 'public interest.' Portions of its message, most prominently the
lines, 'Abortions are now legal in New York. There are not residency re-
quirements,' involve the exercise of the freedom of communicating infor-
mation and disseminating opinion."'6 4 Although the Court noted that
"the activity advertised pertained to constitutional interests,' 5 ie.,
abortion, this factor was not central to the Court's analysis.'"
Sex selection amniocentesis also involves the communication of infor-
mation of interest to the recipient and it pertains to the constitutional
right of abortion. Thus, a similar first amendment interest is suggested.
Ascertaining the existence of such an interest, however, merely begins
analysis, for the "First Amendment interest at stake [must be weighed]
against the public interest allegedly served by the regulation."'""
In Bigelow, the regulation's purpose was "to ensure that pregnant
women in Virginia who decided to have abortions come to their deci-
sions without the commercial advertising pressure usually incidental to
the sale of a box of soap powder."'6 8 However, the Court dismissed this
purpose on a special ground; it held that a state "may not, under the
guise of exercising internal police powers, bar a citizen from another
State from disseminating information about an activity that is legal in
that State."'69 By so grounding its decision, the Court left open the ques-
tion as to how the issues would have been resolved in a purely intra-
state context. That the territoriality proposition the Court forwarded
rests on such a weak doctrinal ground' 0 suggests, however, that the
Court's real concern was a woman's right to relevant information re-
garding the abortion decision. If this was the Court's true rationale, it
lends great weight to the position that prohibition of sex selection am-
niocentesis would be an unconstitutional infringement of a pregnant
"6 Id. at 818-22.
" Id. at 822.
Id.
' The Court agreed with the lower court that this was "a First Amendment case [and]
not an abortion case." Id. at 815 n.5. "[In this case .... First Amendment interests coin-
cided with the constitutional interests of the general public." Id. at 822.
,6 Id. at 826.
Id. at 814 (quoting Virginia v. Bigelow, 213 Va. 191, 196, 191 S.E.2d 173, 176 (1972)).
421 U.S. at 824-25.
170 Id. at 829-31, 834-36 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Problems arise in applying the Court's
territoriality rationale. For example, the Court has noted in dicta that a state could prohibit
an advertisement for prostitution. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n Human Rela-
tions, 413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973). However, prostitution is legal in Nevada and thus, under the
Court's holding in Bigelow, Nevada brothels ostensibly could -launch a nationwide advertis-
ing campaign. See 61 CORNELL L. REV. 640, 644 n.15 (1976). Such a result further suggests
the lack of doctrinal strength of the territoriality holding of Bigelow.
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woman's first amendment rights. However, this was not the Court's
stated rationale and Bigelow is limited in its constitutional application
by its facts since the Court expresses no opinion on whether a state
could prohibit such advertisements in a purely intrastate context.
An intrastate situation was involved in Virginia State Board of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council Inc.,"' in which the Court
held a prohibition of advertisements for retail drug prices unconstitu-
tional. In this context, the Court said that a state may not "completely
suppress the dissemiuation of concededly truthful information about en-
tirely lawful activity, fearful of that information's effect upon its dissem-
inators and its recipients." ' Similar concerns led the Court in Linmark
Associates v. Township of Willingboro' to strike down a local ban on
"For Sale" signs posted in front of residential homes. The ban was in-
tended to curtail "white flight" from integrated neighborhoods.1 7 The
Court found that the basic constitutional defect in the ordinance was
that it prevented
residents from obtaining.., information ... of vital interest to [them]
... bear[ing] on one of the most important decisions they have a right
to make: where to live and raise their families. The [local govern-
ment] has sought to restrict the free flow of these data because it
fears that otherwise homeowners will make decisions inimical to what
.the [government] views as the homeowners' self-interest and the [gov-
ernment's interest]: they will choose to leave town."5
Similarly, a sex selection abortion statute would prevent women from
obtaining information of interest to them, bearing on a most important
decision they have a recognized right to make: whether to have an abor-
tion. In addition, a state which prohibited sex selection amniocentesis
would be suppressing dissemination of truthful information fearful of
the information's effect: that women would choose to have sex selection
abortions.
Bigelow, Virginia State Board of Pharmacy and Linmark Associates
thus suggest that a woman may have a first amendment right to infor-
mation of interest to her in exercising her constitutional right to seek
an abortion. However, these cases address the issues of public speech.
Although a recent case suggests individuals' private speech has similar
protection,78 the constitutional concerns in the two areas are not the
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
,r Id. at 773.
,1 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
,' Id. at 87-88.
'7 Id. at 96 (alternative holding).
176 Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979). Even in Givhan,
however, while the communication of the speech occurred in private, it was related to




same177 and the degree to which these cases' broad declarations are ap-
plicable at all to private speech is far from clear. More importantly, the
government is entitled to suppress the flow of information which forms
the basis for certain kinds of "unlawful" decisions. In Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy, the underlying commercial transaction, prescription
drug sales, was an "entirely lawful activity"; the state could not sup-
press truthful information about that activity because it had no
legitimate interest in doing so. Thus, the distinction between protected
and unprotected commercial speech turns on the nature of the underly-
ing commercial transaction and the state's interest in prohibiting such
an activity. For example, if the ordinance in Linmark Associates had
prohibited signs which stated a preference for sales to whites, the
statute would have withstood constitutional scrutiny.7' Likewise, in a
private speech context, a job interviewer may be discouraged from ask-
ing numerous questions regarded as sexist, even though the information
he or she seeks would be used in formulating a decision.' When the
Court refers to the flow of truthful and legitimate information, it im-
plies that there are limits on the right to listen and that the state has
the authority to restrict the flow of some kinds of information.
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission of Human Relations...
recognized this authority. The Court upheld an ordinance prohibiting
newspapers from running separate classified advertisement columns for
men and women job-seekers. A companion ordinance outlawed sex dis-
crimination in employment."' The Court said: "Any First Amendment
interest which might be served by advertising an ordinary commercial
proposal and which might arguably outweigh the governmental interest
supporting the regulation is altogether absent when the commercial ac-
tivity itself is illegal and the restriction on advertising is incidental to a
valid limitation on economic activity.""' Job-seekers have no constitu-
tional right to know the potential employer's sex preferences for
workers, the employer had no right to communicate that information
and, under the Court's holding, a government agency may "enter a com-
posing room of a newspaper and dictate ... the layout and makeup of
the newspaper's pages . .. in order to carry out [the] governmental
policy" of eliminating sex discrimination."3 Indeed, the state interest in
".. See id. at 415 n.4.
"' See United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972).
171 See generally Kaplowitz v. The Univ. of Chicago, 387 F. Supp. 42, 47-48 (N.D. Ill. 1974);
SEX DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE 85-87 (K. Lawrence & K. Klos eds. 1978).
... 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
"' Id. at 388-89.
' Id. at 389.
"' Id. at 402-03 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Of course, the constitutionality of prohibiting
sex discrimination in employment was not even challenged, although in the substantive due
process era of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), such a prohibition could have been




eradicating this form of sexism was so strong that it outweighed, to an
extent, the first amendment freedom of the press, in addition to what-
ever interest the employer and job-seekers had in the free flow of
legitimate commercial information. By analogy, the government may
prevent a woman from finding out the sex of her fetus if it has a similar
legitimate state purpose.
State prohibition of sex selection amniocentesis and abortion could be
justified on several grounds. First, amniocentesis is a scarce resource
and "requests for fetal sex identification could swamp" the system
which arguably should be reserved for those who intend to use it to pre-
vent the birth of children with serious defects.8 ' This position finds sup-
port in Maher v. Roe, which emphasized the state's power to allocate
scarce resources in accordance with a legislatively determined set of
priorities.185 Second, while amniocentesis itself is now relatively safe, ex-
panded use would lead to more numerous complications than heretofore
experienced.188 More importantly, however, from the perspective of
maternal health, late second trimester abortion is a serious procedure-
more dangerous than carrying the infant to term-and the state could
assert its interest in maternal health. 8 ' Third, the state could assert its
interest in maintaining a balanced sex ratio in order to prevent a sur-
plus of males in society.88 Fourth, the state has legitimate interests in
discouraging sexism in society.'89 These interests not only provide a
18 L. KARP, supra note 3, at 123. "[Ljaboratory facilities and manpower are not sufficient
to handle the volume of work that would accrue if sex determination on request were to
become routine." Id. "Requests for fetal sex identification could swamp an already overloaded
system or delay laboratory work in cases of serious genetic diseases." Fletcher, supra note
17, at 551; see ANTENATAL DIAGNOSIS, supra note 13, at 1-131, 1-187; Milunsky, supra note
19, at 61.
18 See 432 U.S. at 478-79.
I See Miller, An Overview of Problems Arising from Amniocentesis, in EARLY
DIAGNOSIS OF HUMAN GENETIC DEFECTS 23, 27-28 (M. Harris ed. 1970). "Estimates of the
hazards of amniocentesis that are based on carefully controlled studies by experienced
obstetricians may be far too low when less experienced individuals carry out the proce-
dure." Id. at 28; see ANTENATAL DIAGNOSIS, supra note 13, at 1-154 to -155.
' See text accompanying note 76 supra.
See notes 22-23 & accompanying text supra.
See notes 29-30 & accompanying text supra. If sex selection abortion is considered a
sexist practice, the fact that the fetus is not recognized as a "person" under the Constitu-
tion is irrelevant to the legitimacy of this state interest. In this regard, it should be noted
that the government could decide to promote or encourage sex selection, rather than pro-
hibit it. A thorough discussion of the constitutionality of state promotion or facilitation of
sex selection abortion is outside the scope of this note. However, several observations
regarding this issue are pertinent since, in some cases, the same constitutional factors
which may permit the state to proscribe a given activity may also prevent the state from
supporting that activity.
Government support of sex selection abortion could take the form of: first, specific fund-
ing of sex selection amniocentesis; second, part of a larger program funding all am-
niocenteses, aimed primarily at reducing the incidence of prenatally diagnosable disease,
but including sex determination as well; third, part of a program funding all health services
(e.g., national health insurance); fourth, transfer payments to indigent women (e.g.,
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basis for state action, but further call into question the "legitimacy" of
the information sought by a woman who desires a sex selection abor-
tion- identification of fetal sex.
Although it might appear that by employing a balancing test in the
first amendment area the Court would inevitably reach the same result
that it would under the balancing test in the abortion area, this is not
necessarily the case. While it is true that a woman's possible right to
information concerning her fetus' sex is connected with her abortion
liberty, the former would not have to owe its existence to the latter. A
woman could have an interest in knowing the sex of her child before its
birth even if she did not intend to obtain an abortion. Moreover, the
balancing test the Court employs in the abortion area is more struc-
tured, linked as it is to certain specified interests of the woman and
state. 9 ' The balancing test in the first amendment area is more general,
the Court weighing the legitimacy of the information sought against the
state interest in restricting access to the information.
Any constitutional interest a woman may have in discovering the sex
of her fetus would seem to be outweighed by the countervailing state in-
terests. The state interests in preserving the scarce resource of am-
niocentesis, protecting maternal health, preventing a skewed sex ratio
and discouraging sexism can be perceived as powerful justifications for
state action. A woman's interest in discovering her fetus' sex rests on
less firm ground. The very legitimacy of the information she seeks is
suspect if one characterizes the practice of sex selection abortion as sex-
Medicaid) either for all amniocenteses or just for sex selection; fifth, indirect support by
funding facilities which perform sex selection amniocentsis; or sixth, judicial support of sex
selection abortion through recognition of "wrongful sex" tort actions.
Any of these state actions facilitating sex selection could be attacked as a violation of the
equal protection clause, since sex-based distinctions must "serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives." Califano
v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977).
Although the Supreme Court has declared that "the word 'person,' as used in the Four-
teenth Amendment, does not include the unborn," Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 158, it has
recognized an "important and legitimate" state interest in the unborn, id. at 162. The state
is not constitutionally required to recognize that interest. See id. at 163-64. But by pro-
viding funding for amniocentesis, it is asserting a state interest in the unborn. While it is
true that the interest the state thus asserts is to prevent the fetus from being born, the
fetus is nonetheless an object of the state's interest. Given this premise, it is contended
that when the state chooses to assert its influence over the unborn, the fetus is endowed
with those constitutional rights which are not inconsistent with the state of being unborn.
This proposition finds support in Roe, which itself noted that the unborn had been afforded
rights in the past, but were not "persons in the whole sense." Id. at 162 (emphasis added).
There is, however, no reason why a fetus, a human being with the attribute of sex, cannot
be considered a person for the limited purpose of protecting it against state sponsored sex
discrimination. "[Dlepending on the circumstances involved, public policy and other factors,
legal personality will be accorded or withheld as these extrinsic considerations demand."
Byrn v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 38 A.D.2d 316, 329, 329 N.Y.S.2d 722, 734
(1972) (dictum).
See notes 62-69 & accompanying text supra.
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ist and the importance of the information to her is difficult to assess.
While a balancing of these interests suggests that the state may pro-
hibit sex selection amniocentesis, the conclusion one reaches using such
a general balancing test is inescapably judgmental.
CONCLUSION
A legislative prohibition of sex selection abortion could withstand
constitutional scrutiny. A woman does not have a constitutional right to
an abortion "for whatever reason she alone chooses.. 9 Under Roe, a
woman has a right to an abortion to avoid significant burdens; she does
not have a right to an abortion to ensure the birth of a child of a ceratin
sex. In addition, the Court's reassessment of the nature and scope of the
abortion liberty in recent cases suggests that the Court is willing to
give legislatures greater latitude in resolving particularly difficult ques-
tions concerning abortion. The state may influence the decisionmaking
process of a woman seeking an abortion so long as the state does not un-
duly burden her right to seek one. The Court has upheld statutory
schemes which burden a woman's ability to seek an abortion much more
significantly than would a prohibition of sex selection abortion; thus a
prohibition of sex selection amniocentesis would not unduly burden a
woman's right to seek an abortion.
Furthermore, an analysis of an individual's interest in the free flow of
legitimate information indicates that a prohibition of sex selection am-
niocentesis could not be successfully challenged as an infringement of
first amendment rights. The state has strong and legitimate interests in
discouraging the practice of sex selection abortion. These interests
would appear to outweigh a woman's interest in discovering the sex of
the fetus she carries.
JOHN R. SCHAIBLEY III
1.1 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153.
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